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Abstract 
With	the	increased	interest	in	developing	offshore	fields	by	subsea	completions,	also	
comes	the	need	for	minimizing	the	non‐productive	time	of	these	systems	caused	by	
unexpected	 failures	 and	 lengthy	 repairs.	 Maintenance	 interventions	 that	 could	 be	
considered	 simple	 for	 surface	 equipment	 can	 become	 expensive	 and	 complicated	
when	 executed	 under	 water	 due	 to	 the	 difficult	 accessibility	 of	 the	 equipment.	 A	
simple	failure	of	a	subsea	component	can	cause	shutdown	of	a	well	for	several	days	
or	even	weeks	until	 a	 repair	 is	 carried	out,	 thus	affecting	hydrocarbon	production	
rates	significantly.	
Failure	 of	 components	 is	 unavoidable,	 but	 by	 introducing	 condition	monitoring	 to	
subsea	production	systems	(SPS),	operators	can	diagnose	and	predict	failures	early,	
which	allows	them	to	plan	maintenance	activities	in	advance	and	reduce	downtime.	
Most	 of	 today’s	 subsea	 control	 systems	 collect	 great	 amount	 of	 data	 about	 the	
process	 and	 the	 operational	 parameters	 of	 the	 equipment,	 but	 this	 information	 is	
not	used	to	determine	the	condition	of	the	asset	and	predict	future	failures.	The	aim	
of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 develop	 a	 methodology	 tailored	 for	 conventional	 SPS,	 for	
appropriate	 utilization	 of	 available	 monitoring	 techniques	 and	 identification	 of	
additional	 surveillance	 methods	 needed	 to	 guarantee	 high	 system	 availability.	
Furthermore,	 this	 methodology	 describes	 how	 to	 integrate	 these	 monitoring	
methods	into	a	comprehensive	condition	monitoring	program	that	is	able	to	detect	
asset	state,	diagnose	faults,	predict	future	failures	and	provide	decision	support	for	
maintenance	intervention.		
Considerable	 research	 and	 many	 standards	 have	 been	 written	 for	 condition	
monitoring	 of	 complex	machinery,	mostly	 for	 rotating	machinery	 and	 some	 static	
machines	for	surface	or	onshore	facilities,	but	little	investigation	has	been	done	with	
respect	to	subsea	equipment.	The	purpose	of	this	research	study	is	to	bridge	the	gap	
by	 creating	 a	 set	 of	 guidelines	 for	 implementation	 of	 condition	 monitoring	
specifically	for	SPS,	and	make	recommendations	for	application	of	these	guidelines	
for	the	benefit	of	both	field	operators	and	subsea	equipment	manufacturers.	
A	 methodic	 process	 was	 created	 to	 guide	 the	 user	 through	 the	 different	 steps	 of	
creating	 a	 program	 for	 condition	 monitoring	 of	 underwater	 equipment,	 with	
emphasis	in	the	active	elements	used	to	measure	and	control	the	flow	of	oil	and	gas,	
i.e.	 control	 systems	 (SCM,	 instruments,	 sensors,	 valves,	 electrical/hydraulic	 flying	
leads,	etc.)	and	production	equipment	(XTs,	manifolds	and	distribution	units).	Risers,	
flowlines,	umbilicals,	 structures	and	subsea	processing	systems	are	excluded	 from	
this	 work.	 The	 methodology	 is	 exemplified	 with	 two	 case	 studies:	 First	 for	 gate	
valves	with	hydraulic	actuators	and,	second	for	the	power	supply	unit	located	in	the	
subsea	electronic	module.	
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem description and background 
For	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 we	 have	 seen	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 subsea	 field	
developments,	especially	as	an	alternative	solution	 for	deep	waters,	 satellite	 fields	
or	 subsea‐to‐shore	 schemes.	 As	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Figure	 1‐1,	 the	 oil	 and	 gas	
production	from	subsea	wells	has	surpassed	the	production	from	dry	wells	in	2010.		
Subsea	development	allow	companies	 to	exploit	 fields	 in	a	way	 that	would	not	be	
economically	 feasible	 otherwise,	 but	 they	 also	 have	 some	 drawbacks	 such	 as	
reduced	availability	and	lower	ultimate	recovery.	[1,	2]	
Some	studies	have	shown	that	availability	of	subsea	assets	can	be	as	low	as	90	%	[3].	
Availability	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 fraction	 of	 time	 that	 a	 system,	 subsystem	 or	
component	is	in	normal	operating	condition,	and	can	be	calculated	as	
	
	 	ܣݒ݈ܾ݈ܽ݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	 ൌ 	 ெ்஻ிெ்஻ிାெ்்ோ	 (1)	
	
Where:	
MTBF	is	the	Mean	Time	Between	Failures	or	uptime	
MTTR	is	the	Mean	Time	To	Repair	or	downtime	
	
Availability	 of	 subsea	 equipment	 is	 usually	 lower	 than	 topside	machinery	mainly	
because	repairs	on	a	deck	of	a	platform,	where	personnel,	tools	and	spare	parts	are	
usually	readily	available,	is	much	easier	than	intervening	a	subsea	system.		A	subsea	
system,	on	the	other	hand,	requires	that	a	service	vessel,	Remote	Operated	Vehicle	
	
Figure	1‐1	‐	Subsea	vs.	dry	wells	[1,	2]	
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(ROV),	 specialized	 personnel,	 subsea	 tools,	 etc.	 be	 allocated	 prior	 performing	 the	
repairs,	 coupled	 with	 other	 factors	 like	 weather	 conditions	 which	 have	 to	 be	
favorable	for	the	operation.	
The	lower	recovery	factor	from	subsea	wells	is	a	result	of	limited	well	intervention	
of	 this	 type	 of	 completion	 in	 comparison	 with	 dry	 wells.	 For	 many	 platform	
installations,	 well	 intervention	 is	 done	 through	 the	 drill	 rig	 already	 installed	 on	
topsides,	 whereas,	 for	 subsea	 wells,	 a	 Mobile	 Offshore	 Drilling	 Unit	 (MODU)	 or	
intervention	vessel	has	to	be	hired,	which	implies	high	OPEX	and	in	many	cases	high	
Non	Productive	Time	(NPT)	 related	 to	delays	 in	 the	 intervention	operation	due	 to	
bad	 weather	 or	 unavailability	 of	 rig/vessel.	 In	 an	 investigation	 done	 by	 Statoil,	
Hydro	 and	 the	 Norwegian	 Petroleum	 Directorate	 (NPD)	 it	 was	 determined	 that	
subsea	completions	can	have	a	an	ultimate	recovery	factor	up	to	20%	lower	than	dry	
wells	with	direct	access	from	the	platform	[4].	 	
As	a	result	of	the	issues	mentioned	above	a	Subsea	Production	System	(SPS),	must	
have	 high	 Reliability,	 Availability,	 Maintainability	 and	 Supportability	 (RAMS)	 in	
order	 to	 be	 cost	 efficient.	 This	 study	 will	 focus	 on	 improving	 reliability	 and	
availability	of	 SPS’s	 through	advanced	Condition	Monitoring	 (CM)	 techniques	with	
the	ultimate	goal	of	minimizing	NPT.		
The	 subsea	 industry	 currently	 faces	 several	 challenges	 with	 respect	 to	 condition	
monitoring,	such	as:	
 Lack	 of	 specialized	 CM	 equipment	 for	 subsea	 applications	 due	 to	 the	 short	
history	of	the	subsea	industry.	
 Intermittent	operation	of	many	of	 the	processes	 (e.g.	 triggering	of	a	 subsea	
control	module	solenoid	valve)	makes	failure	prediction	difficult.	
 Current	conditions	monitored	in	conventional	SPS’s	provide	process	data,	but	
little	or	no	information	about	the	integrity	of	the	equipment.	
 Remoteness	 and	 difficult	 accessibility	 of	 the	 subsea	 equipment,	 makes	
calibration,	 upgrades	 and	maintenance	 of	 CM	 equipment	 difficult	 and	 very	
expensive.	
This	 thesis	 has	 been	 written	 in	 collaboration	 with	 Cameron,	 provider	 of	 flow	
equipment	 products	 including	 Subsea	 Production	 Systems,	 as	 part	 of	 the	
development	 of	 a	 business	 strategy	 called	 “Intelligent	 Field”.	 Cameron	 provided	
valuable	 information	with	regards	 to	subsea	equipment	design	and	operation,	and	
reliability	data	and	studies.	
1.2 Scope and objectives 
The	scope	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	evaluate	 the	CM	technologies	available	 in	 the	market	
and	recommend	a	CM	strategy	that	can	be	used	in	SPS’s	with	the	main	goal	being	the	
reduction	of	non‐productive	time	for	oil	and	gas	offshore	operators.	
The	main	objectives	of	this	thesis	are:	
 Investigate	 various	 surveillance	 techniques	 currently	 used	 in	 subsea	 and	
other	industries.	
 Recommend	CM	techniques	that	can	add	value	to	SPS’s.	
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 Provide	 a	 methodology	 and	 detailed	 guidelines	 for	 implementing	 a	 health	
monitoring	 system	 that	 helps	 operators	 visualize	 the	 status	 of	 subsea	
equipment	 and	 facilitates	 the	 decision	 making	 process	 for	 maintenance	
activities.	
 Demonstrate	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 methodology	 with	 use	 of	 practical	
examples.	
1.3 Delimitations 
This	 thesis	 is	 limited	 to	 Subsea	 Production	 Systems;	 specifically	 to	 the	 active	
equipment	used	to	measure	and	control	the	flow	of	oil	and	gas,	i.e.	control	systems	
(SCM,	 instruments,	 sensors,	 valves,	 electrical/hydraulic	 flying	 leads,	 etc.)	 and	
production	 equipment	 (XTs,	 manifolds	 and	 distribution	 units).	 Risers,	 flowlines,	
umbilicals,	 structures	 and	 processing	 systems	 (boosting,	 compression	 and	
separation)	are	excluded	from	this	work.	
Special	 emphasis	 is	 given	 to	 Cameron	 equipment;	 however,	 the	 condition	
monitoring	 technologies	 and	 solutions	 described	 herein	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 subsea	
equipment	from	different	manufacturers.	SPS’s	are	described	in	detail	in	section	2.5.	
1.4 Methodology 
Initially,	a	thorough	literature	review	was	done	about	CM	applications	in	fields	other	
than	 subsea	 oil	 and	 gas	 production.	 Then	 the	 current	 equipment	 surveillance	
technologies	used	in	subsea	and	other	industries	were	investigated	and	compared	in	
order	to	see	how	subsea	equipment	providers	and	field	operators	can	benefit	from	
other	 ‐more	mature‐	 industries.	 Meetings	 with	 CM	 equipment/software	 suppliers	
were	 held	 in	 order	 to	 get	more	 in‐depth	 knowledge	 about	 their	 products	 and	 the	
different	 options	 available.	 Also,	 studied	 was	 how	 Cameron	 competitors	 are	
handling	condition	monitoring	as	part	of	their	service	strategies,	with	the	purpose	of	
knowing	where	Cameron	stands	in	the	subsea	arena.	
The	 author	 met	 with	 different	 CM	 package	 providers	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
systems	 available	 in	 the	market	 and	 determine	what	 would	 be	 the	most	 suitable	
solutions	for	Cameron.	
The	 International	 Organization	 for	 Standardization	 (ISO)	 has	 created	 several	
guidelines	 for	 condition	monitoring	 [5‐9]	 that	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 this	 research,	
and	as	a	result	these	guidelines	were	examined.	However,	these	standards	are	quite	
general	 and	 a	 revised	 methodology	 for	 CM	 implementation	 was	 created	 in	
accordance	with	Cameron	needs.	The	procedure	 included	 flowcharts	with	detailed	
explanation	of	every	process	and	the	use	of	two	case	studies	to	demonstrate	how	it	
should	be	used.	
The	thesis	was	written	mostly	in	Cameron	office	in	Stavanger.	During	the	course	of	
this	research	the	author	traveled	twice	to	Cameron	office	 in	Celle,	Germany	where	
subsea	control	modules	are	designed	and	fabricated.	Discussions	were	held	in	Celle	
with	 subsea	 software	 engineers	 to	 obtain	 detailed	 information	 about	 how	 the	
control	 system	 works	 and	 find	 the	 best	 monitoring	 applications	 for	 these	
technologies	 (i.e.	 what	 to	 measure?)	 In	 addition	 to	 meeting	 with	 engineers	 in	
Germany,	the	writer	took	advantage	of	the	 large	network	of	professionals	working	
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in	Cameron	around	the	world	to	gain	knowledge	about	other	subsea	products	such	
as	xmas	trees,	manifolds	and	valves.	
1.5 Structure of the report 
This	report	is	structured	as	follow	
	
Chapter	1	
Introduction	
Description	of	the	problem,	the	scope	of	work	of	this	report	with	
the	 goals	 delimitations	 and	methodology	 used	 to	 develop	 this	
research.	
Chapter	2	
State	of	the	art	
Definition	 of	 intelligent	 energy	 and	 different	 maintenance	
strategies,	 with	 focus	 on	 condition	 based	 maintenance.	 	 A	
discussion	 is	 given	 on	 the	 trends	 in	 condition	 monitoring	
techniques	 in	 subsea	 and	 other	 industries.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	
chapter,	 subsea	 production	 systems	 are	 explained	 and	
illustrated.	
Chapter	3	
Methodology	
Explanation	of	 the	methodology	 created	 for	 implementation	of	
condition	monitoring	program	 for	Cameron	 subsea	production	
system.	The	procedure	is	summarized	by	a	process	flowchart.	
Chapter	4	
Case	studies	
Two	case	studies	are	presented	that	explore	the	different	issues	
encountered	 during	 implementation	 of	 condition	 monitoring	
techniques	in	subsea	equipment	and	to	describe	with	examples	
the	methodology	proposed	in	chapter	3.	
Chapter	5	
Discussion	and	
recommendations	
Discussion	about	the	methodology	proposed	and	the	factors	that	
affect	 condition	 monitoring	 of	 subsea	 systems	 due	 to	 their	
singularity.	Recommendations	are	given	for	future	work	in	this	
area	 and	 for	 improvements	 in	 the	 way	 condition	 Cameron	
currently	handles	monitoring.	
Chapter	6	
Conclusions	
This	 thesis	 ends	with	 concluding	 remarks	 on	 the	 investigation	
performed	and	the	contributions	to	the	industry.	
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2 State of the art 
2.1 Intelligent Energy 
The	 offshore	 industry	 has	 undergone	 many	 changes	 since	 the	 first	 offshore	 well	
completion	in	1947	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	More	specifically	in	subsea,	we	have	seen	
tremendous	changes	with	respect	to	downhole	instrumentation	and	subsea	controls,	
as	depicted	in	Figure	2‐1.	
	
While	 the	 development	 of	 new	 technologies	 in	 previous	 decades	 was	 centered	
purely	 on	 the	 instrumentation,	 in	 the	 last	 5‐7	 years	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increased	
interest	in	Intelligent	Energy.	This	novel	term	is	defined	as	the	deployment	of	state‐
of‐the‐art	 technology	 and	 procedures	 that	 enable	 operators	 to	 monitor,	 analyze,	
control	and	manage	 their	 field	remotely	and	 in	real‐time	with	 the	ultimate	goal	of	
optimizing	 production,	 reducing	 downtime	 and	 enhancing	 safety	 performance.	
Intelligent	Energy	is	a	new	holistic	way	to	manage	oil	and	gas	fields.	
Major	oil	companies	introduced	the	Intelligent	Energy	concept	in	the	middle	of	the	
last	decade.	More	recently,	service	providers	and	Original	Equipment	Manufacturers	
(OEM)	have	also	adopted	this	concept	to	offer	solutions	for	their	clients	that	are	in	
alignment	with	the	their	goals.	The	Intelligent	Field	concept	has	been	given	different	
names	 depending	 on	 the	 company:	 Smart	 Field	 (Shell),	 Integrated	 Operations	
(Statoil),	 Field	of	the	Future	 (BP),	 iField	 (Chevron),	Digital	Oilfield	 (Petrobras)	 and	
Digital	 Energy	 (Schlumberger)	 [10].	 The	 term	 Integrated	 Operations	 (IO)	 is	
commonly	used	in	Norway.	Cameron	approach	to	Intelligent	Energy	has	been	named	
Intelligent	Field	and	its	purpose	is	to	develop	a	more	holistic	field	solution	business	
vs.	product	offerings,	i.e.	Integrated	Systems	Solutions.	
		
Figure	2‐1	‐	Evolution	of	downhole	instrumentation	and	subsea	controls	
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An	Intelligent	Field	usually	is	composed	of:	1)	Advanced	instruments	to	monitor	the	
processes	 and	 equipment	 in	 every	 stage,	 2)	 an	 integration	 platform	 where	 all	
different	 software	 and	 databases	 can	 be	 accessed	 in	 one	 place	 and	 remotely,	 3)	
Collaboration	 rooms	 with	 numerous	 screens	 and	 communication	 systems	 where	
onshore	operators	can	access	the	field	data	in	real‐time	and	communicate	effectively	
with	 offshore	 operators	 or	 experts	 located	 remotely.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 monitor	 and	
control	many	of	the	offshore	processes	from	the	office,	in	an	environment	(virtual	or	
real)	 that	 allows	 collaboration	 between	 multiple	 disciplines	 without	 the	 need	 to	
travel	offshore.	
The	benefits	of	an	Intelligent	Energy	scheme	are	many:	increased	production;	higher	
ultimate	 recovery	 factors;	 safer	 and	 cleaner	 operations;	 lower	 operating	 costs;	
better	 interdepartmental	 collaboration;	 better	 communication	 between	 operators,	
contractors	 and	 suppliers;	 and	 extended	 field	 life.	 The	 economic	 benefits	 vary	
among	operators,	Shell	for	example,	ensures	that	by	implementing	their	Smart	Field	
technology	they	can	increase	production	up	to	10%	[11],	while	a	research	conducted	
by	 the	 Norwegian	 Oil	 Industry	 Association	 (OLF)	 in	 2006	 revealed	 that	 the	
implementation	of	 Integrated	Operations	in	the	Norwegian	Continental	Shelf	could	
yield	an	increase	in	Net	Present	Value	of	NOK	250	billion	[12].	
As	Edison	et	al.	[10]	show	in	Figure	2‐2,	the	implementation	of	an	Intelligent	Field	
strategy	must	follow	a	series	of	progressive	steps	in	order	to	maximize	the	returns	
in	the	shortest	time	possible.	
First,	the	system	should	have	a	set	of	advanced	instruments	that	allow	the	user(s)	
to	 monitor	 the	 equipment	 and	 process	 conditions	 reliably	 and	 in	 real‐time.	 A	
thorough	study	must	be	done	to	 identify	what	parameters	need	to	be	measured	in	
the	 wellbore,	 subsea	 equipment	 and	 surface	 facilities,	 that	 will	 provide	 the	
information	necessary	to	make	decisions	with	respect	to	operation	and	maintenance.	
Once	the	instrumentation	is	in	place,	the	data	have	to	be	gathered,	stored	and	made	
available	 to	 the	different	parties	 involved	 in	 the	 intelligent	 field,	 from	 service	 and	
equipment	 providers	 to	 field	 operators.	 It	 is	 very	 important	 that	 the	 system	 is	
designed	 in	 a	 holistic	 way,	 allowing	 for	 the	 integration	 and	 collaboration	 of	
different	departments	and	organizations,	including	suppliers	and	contractors.	
The	amount	of	data	monitored	 in	an	 intelligent	 field	 can	be	enormous.	To	give	an	
idea,	for	an	all‐electrical	X‐mas	tree,	1.3	million	data	points	are	measured	every	day.	
In	order	to	interpret	the	data,	software	engineers	have	to	create	algorithms	that	can	
turn	 raw	 data	 into	 real	 time	 intelligent	 alerts.	 Moreover,	 event	 management	
should	 be	 based	 on	 standard	 process	 flow	 and	 procedures.	 However,	 generating	
alerts	 that	 provide	 critical	 conditions	 is	 not	 enough;	 the	 system	 should	 provide	
advanced	 analysis	 and	 forecasting	 with	 respect	 to	 equipment	 failures	 and	
performance	of	the	wells.	
The	 last	 step	 is	 to	 use	 all	 the	 data	 collected	 and	 analyzed	 to	make	 decisions	with	
respect	 to	 asset	 optimization,	 i.e.	 plan	 maintenance	 activities,	 revise	 depletion	
strategy,	assess	safety	of	the	operations,	etc.	
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One	of	the	fundamental	pillars	of	the	intelligent	field	concept	is	the	use	of	advanced	
condition	monitoring	 techniques	 that	 help	 asset	managers	 to	minimize	 downtime	
and	increase	life	of	the	field	by	optimizing	their	maintenance	strategies	based	on	the	
state	 of	 the	 equipment.	 Sensors	 in	 subsea	 equipment	 have	 been	 used	 since	 the	
beginning	of	 subsea	production,	mostly	 to	monitor	 operating	 conditions,	 but	 little	
has	 been	 done	 with	 regards	 to	 equipment	 survey.	 In	 this	 thesis	 the	 author	
investigates	 how	 the	 current	 equipment	 surveillance	 technologies	 can	 be	 used	 by	
Cameron	to	develop	a	holistic	asset	management	solution	for	their	clients	that	is	an	
integral	part	of	the	intelligent	field	strategy.	
2.2 Condition Monitoring 
Condition	Monitoring	 can	be	defined	as	 the	 surveillance	of	 equipment	operational	
parameters	and/or	process	variables	of	industrial	machinery	to	determine	its	health.	
The	main	objectives	of	CM	are:	1)	Determine	the	equipment	mechanical	state	and	2)	
Generate	 trends	 of	 the	 equipment	 degradation	 to	 predict	 failure.	 As	 a	 result,	
companies	 can	 plan	maintenance	 activities	 so	 they	 can	 be	 performed	 at	 the	most	
convenient	time	to	minimize	NPT.		
CM	 is	 part	 of	 predictive	 maintenance	 concept	 and	 it	 comes	 from	 an	 evolution	 of	
different	maintenance	strategies.	At	the	beginning	of	the	industrial	era,	maintenance	
was	 considered	 a	 hinder	 to	 production.	 The	 first	 maintenance	 approaches	 were	
based	 on	 replacing	 parts/equipment	 when	 they	 failed	 or	 performed	 at	 levels	 not	
acceptable	 for	 the	 production	 process.	 This	 approach	 known	 as	 corrective	
maintenance	was	merely	 reactive	 and	 therefore	 very	 inefficient.	 Since	 production	
had	to	be	stopped	inadvertently	and	repair	activities	were	not	planned,	a	lot	of	time	
was	lost	in	finding	the	root	cause	of	the	failure,	planning	the	repairs,	obtaining	the	
Figure	2‐2	–	Path	to	implementation	of	intelligent	energy	concept	[10]	
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spare	parts	and	allocating	resources,	which	then	translated	into	high	operating	costs	
and	loss	production.	
It	 is	 worth	mentioning	 that	 corrective	maintenance	 is	 unavoidable;	 yes,	 it	 can	 be	
reduced	 to	 a	minimum	using	 the	 techniques	 explained	hereinafter,	 but	 the	 risk	of	
unexpected	failure	cannot	be	completely	eliminated.	Nevertheless,	and	regardless	of	
the	 maintenance	 strategy	 followed	 by	 a	 company,	 they	 always	 have	 to	 have	 a	
corrective	 maintenance	 strategy	 in	 place	 so	 sudden	 failures	 can	 be	 repaired	 as	
quickly	 as	 possible.	 Some	 measures	 that	 facilitate	 the	 execution	 of	 unanticipated	
repairs	 are	 local	 storage	 of	 critical	 spare	 parts,	 maintenance	 personnel	 on‐call,	
availability	of	equipment	assembly	drawings	and	repair	manuals	on	site,	and	service	
agreements	in	place	with	OEMs	for	immediate	assistance.	
Future	 developments	 of	 maintenance	 strategies	 gave	 origin	 to	 preventive	
maintenance,	a	more	efficient	method,	also	known	as	time‐based	maintenance	 [13].	
Preventive	maintenance	is	based	on	the	fact	that	machines	degrade	over	time,	thus	
replacement	of	wearable	parts	is	scheduled	on	fixed‐intervals	(e.g.	change	oil	of	a	4‐
stroke	 engine	 every	 10000	 km).	 One	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 with	 time‐based	
maintenance	 is	 that	 parts	 wear	 differently,	 depending	 on	 operating	 and	 process	
conditions,	 intermittency,	 external	 loads,	 material	 quality,	 etc.	 and	 as	 a	 result	
replacement	 of	 parts	 can	 occur	 too	 early	 or	 even	 worse,	 breakdowns	 can	 occur	
between	replacement	intervals	if	the	part	degraded	faster	than	expected.	
The	issues	aforementioned	led	to	conception	of	new	maintenance	philosophies	such	
as	predictive	maintenance,	also	referred	to	as	Condition‐Based	Maintenance	(CBM).	
With	this	approach	maintenance	engineers	try	to	predict	failures	and	determine	the	
optimum	maintenance	 intervals	 based	 on	 the	 current	 condition	 of	 the	 equipment	
and	 the	 trends	 in	 degradation	 of	 components.	 Predictive	 maintenance	 uses	
condition	monitoring	techniques	as	means	to	track	the	degradation	(monitoring	of	
effects)	of	equipment/parts	and	then	uses	 this	 information	to	predict	 failures.	The	
process	of	how	CBM	systems	works	is	shown	in		Figure	2‐3.		
First	 the	data	 is	measured	using	 sensors	 installed	on	 the	 equipment	or	by	mobile	
measurement	 equipment	 used	 periodically.	 Then	 the	 data	 is	 gathered,	 stored	 in	 a	
	
	Figure	2‐3	‐	CBM	process	
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database	 and	processed	 for	 further	 analysis.	 Processing	 the	data	 can	be	 sampling,	
compression,	 aliasing,	 transformation,	 etc.,	 depending	on	 the	parameter	measured	
and	the	output	needed.	After	the	data	is	ready,	it	is	then	analyzed.	This	is	a	two‐fold	
process,	on	one	side	the	 information	 is	used	to	determine	the	current	degradation	
state	of	 the	equipment	or	component	(diagnosis)	and	on	the	other	side	the	data	 is	
used	 to	 generate	 a	 degradation	 trend	 and	 predict	 future	 failure	 (prognosis).	 The	
diagnosis	and	prognosis	are	usually	performed	with	the	aid	of	algorithms.	Finally,	a	
decision	 is	made	 to	 recommend	maintenance	action.	The	decision	making	process	
can	 be	 done	 manually	 by	 experts	 or	 automated	 by	 use	 of	 numerical	 models.	
Essential	 information	 such	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 equipment	 and	 degradation	
trends	are	displayed	throughout	the	monitoring	process	in	a	user‐friendly	format	to	
provide	the	operators	with	a	good	overview	of	the	equipment	condition.	
According	to	the	German	Institute	of	Standardization	(DIN)	the	CBM	methodology	is	
based	 on	 understanding	 the	 degradation	 (wear	 out)	 level	 of	 the	 asset	 in	 order	 to	
determine	its	overall	condition.	As	depicted	in	Figure	2‐4	[14],	the	remaining	useful	
life	of	an	asset	can	be	defined	as	wear	out	reserve	and	for	most	mechanical	systems	
it	reduces	overtime	as	equipment	degrades	with	use.	When	the	equipment	is	in	new	
condition	the	wear	out	reserve	is	100%;	then	this	reserve	decreases	over	time	due	
to	 equipment	 degradation.	 The	 figure	 shows	 a	 repair	 carried	 out	 after	 the	
equipment	 has	 failed.	 The	 CBM	 concept	 is	 introduced	 to	 monitor	 the	 asset	
continuously	 or	 periodically	 to	 identify	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 equipment	 and	
generate	 trends	 that	 can	 predict	 when	 the	 damage	 most	 likely	 will	 start,	 so	
maintenance	 activities	 can	 take	 place	before	 this	 point,	 and	 bring	 the	 equipment	
back	to	 its	original	condition.	The	ultimate	purpose	of	CBM	is	to	 find	the	optimum	
time	to	perform	maintenance,	 i.e.	not	so	early	 that	 the	equipment	would	still	have	
significant	 life	 remaining	 and	 not	 so	 late	 so	 that	 the	 equipment	 would	 suffer	
irreversible	damage	or	break	down.	
In	recent	years,	predictive	maintenance	has	gone	one	step	further	and	evolved	into	
proactive	 maintenance	 or	 Condition	 and	 Performance	 Monitoring	 (CPM)	 which	
allows	the	system	to	monitor	the	root	causes	of	the	integrity	issues,	based	not	only	
on	 equipment	 condition	 parameters,	 but	 also	 on	 process	 parameters	 [13].	 A	
		
Figure	2‐4	‐	Wear	out	reserve	change	over	time	[14]	
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common	example	of	CPM	is	the	monitoring	of	compressors	where	temperature	and	
pressure	 measurement	 are	 used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 drive	 torque	 and	 speed	 are	
used	 to	 determine	 performance	 of	 the	 compressor	 over	 time	 and	 then	 infer	
degradation	state	and	trend.	
2.3 Condition monitoring techniques currently used in other industries 
Since	the	field	of	CM	in	SPS’s	is	relatively	new,	it	would	be	beneficial	to	investigate	
the	trends	in	other	industries	that	are	more	mature	in	this	area.	
2.3.1 Maritime Industry 
In	 earlier	 times	 of	 maritime	 transportation,	 vessels	 used	 to	 stay	 docked	 for	 long	
periods	 of	 time,	 and	 during	 this	 time	 the	 maintenance	 personnel	 performed	 the	
required	 maintenance	 activities	 to	 keep	 the	 ships	 in	 good	 condition.	 Today	 the	
maritime	 industry	 is	 much	 more	 dynamic;	 companies	 try	 to	 keep	 the	 vessels	 in	
transit	as	much	as	possible	and	time	at	ports	are	minimized	considerably	[15].	This	
change	 in	 the	 way	 the	 business	 is	 performed	 has	 pushed	 companies	 to	 focus	 on	
better	maintenance	strategies	such	as	CBM.	
One	 of	 the	most	 important	 developments	 in	 the	marine	 industry	with	 regards	 to	
maintenance	has	been	the	creation	of	the	Technical	Condition	Index	(TCI),	which	is	a	
measure	 for	 integrity,	 health	 and	 performance	 based	 on	 aggregation	 of	 technical,	
financial	and	statistical	parameters.	The	TCI	technique	uses	a	mathematical	model	to	
describe	the	behavior	of	a	system	and	a	hierarchical	tree	model	of	the	system	where	
one	or	more	TCIs	are	allocated	to	each	node;	then	all	the	TCIs	are	aggregated	from	
the	 lowest	 component	 level	 (child)	 to	 the	 top	 level	 (parent)	 to	 determine	 their	
impact	 on	 their	 parent	 node	 and	 finally	 providing	 a	 top	 level	 status	 (TCI)	 of	 the	
system.		The	index	is	based	on	a	0‐100	scale,	where	0	represents	the	maximum	level	
of	 degradation	 and	 100	 describes	 the	 optimum	 condition	 (“like	 new”	 state).	 A	
system	can	have	several	levels	and	several	nodes	per	level,	each	node	having	its	own	
weight	 depending	 on	 the	 criticality	 of	 its	 condition	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 overall	
condition	of	the	equipment	[16,	17].	The	top	level	TCI	can	be	calculated	as	follows:	
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Where:	
TCIi	is	the	technical	condition	of	child	i	
wi	is	the	weight	of	child	I	(fraction)	
n	is	the	number	of	child	nodes	
	
TCI	 usually	 uses	 a	 traffic	 light	 display	 system	 (Figure	 2‐5)	 to	 identify	 the	 current	
status	of	 the	system	and	subsystems	 in	a	simple	 layout.	When	the	equipment	 is	 in	
healthy	state	the	display	systems	shows	a	green	light	with	no	alarms.	Once	the	state	
of	the	system	degrades	to	a	level	that	affects	performance	and/or	functionality,	the	
system	TCI	changes	to	yellow	and	an	alert	 is	sent	to	 the	personnel	responsible	 for	
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the	 system	 to	 take	 action.	 The	 two	 options	 are	 a)	 start	 planning	 the	maintenance	
tasks	and/or	b)	reduce	the	strain	on	the	affected	part(s)	by	changing	the	operating	
conditions	 in	order	 to	extend	the	 life	of	 the	equipment	until	 the	next	maintenance	
campaign.	If	the	system	reaches	the	red	level,	this	indicates	severe	degradation	and	
occurrence	of	a	failure	or	malfunction.	
The	 TCI	 have	 numerous	 advantages	 over	 traditional	 Key	 Performance	 Indicators	
(KPI)	since	it	provides	information	about	the	system	as	a	whole	and	not	just	only	as	
a	list	of	indicators	for	individual	components.	This	arrangement	can	convey	general	
information	about	the	health	of	 the	asset	to	managers,	and	at	the	same	time	it	can	
drill	 down	 the	 data	 to	 the	 component	 level	 to	 facilitate	 root	 causes	 analysis	 to	
engineers	when	degradation	is	detected.	The	aggregation	approach	of	the	TCI	makes	
it	also	a	very	good	option	for	complex	systems,	with	 large	number	of	parts.	Lastly,	
this	 index	 lets	 operators	 do	 benchmarking	 of	 similar	 equipment	 (e.g.	 vessels	 in	 a	
cargo	fleet)	when	comparing	them	by	their	individual	TCI.	
The	TCI	concept	started	out	as	a	project	for	ageing	management	of	complex	systems	
and	 was	 developed	 by	 the	 Norwegian	 Marine	 Technology	 Research	 Institute	
(MARINTEK)	 and	 the	Norwegian	University	 of	 Science	 and	Technology	 (NTNU)	 in	
collaboration	with	Statoil,	Kværner,	Elkem	and	Forsmark	Kraftgrupp	[15].	
This	methodology	has	been	used	widely	in	the	maritime	industry	and	it	is	gradually	
being	 implemented	 in	 other	 industries	 such	 as	 onshore	 processing	 facilities	 and	
subsea	production	systems.	
2.3.2 Railway 
In	the	railway	industry,	just	as	in	the	maritime	industry	the	time	the	locomotives	are	
standing	 idle	 is	 being	 reduced	 to	 increase	 efficiency.	 Additionally,	 trains	 are	
travelling	 faster,	 more	 routes	 are	 being	 added	 everyday	 and	 railroads	 degrade	
overtime;	 increasing	the	risk	of	collision	and/or	derailment.	Therefore,	 in	order	to	
improve	safety,	reduce	lifecycle	costs	of	rolling	stock	and	railways,	and	ensure	trains	
arrive	 on	 time,	 the	 railway	 industry	 has	 developed	 new	 ways	 of	 condition	
monitoring	for	locomotives,	wagons	and	railways.	
One	of	the	issues	in	the	railway	industry	is	the	deterioration	of	wheels	and	bearings.	
Technologies	 used	 for	 monitoring	 the	 integrity	 of	 these	 parts	 including	 infrared	
technology	 to	 detect	 high	 temperatures	 in	 wheels	 and	 bearings,	 acoustic	 bearing	
Figure	2‐5	‐	Traffic	light	diagnosis	system	
Integrity	within	target
No	action	required
Integrity	level	lower	than	target	range
Asses	status	and	plan	further	actions	
Integrity	level	below	min.	acceptable	level
Immediate	action	required
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detectors	 (microphones)	 used	 to	 record	 sounds	 from	 wagons	 to	 detect	 bearing	
defects	 by	 analyzing	 vibration,	 and	 strain	 gauges	 and	 accelerometers	 are	 used	 to	
measure	 lateral	 and	 vertical	 forces	 that	 identify	wagons	 at	 risk	 of	 derailment	 and	
defects	on	wheels	[18].	
To	detect	defects	or	degradation	of	 the	rail	 tracks,	custom	machine	vision	systems	
have	 been	 developed.	 Machine	 vision	 consists	 of	 using	 photo	 or	 video	 cameras,	
lights,	 sensors	 and	 processors	 to	 identify	 problems	 such	 as	missing	 bolts,	 surface	
defects	 on	 rails,	 rail	 corrugation,	 condition	 of	 timber	 and	 concrete	 crossties,	 and	
uniformity	of	the	ballast	[19].	
Some	 locomotive	 manufacturers	 have	 taken	 the	 CM	 one	 step	 further,	 by	 adding	
remote	monitoring	and	diagnosis	to	the	locomotives	of	their	clients.	In	this	way	the	
OEM	can	receive	the	data	in	real‐time	and	detect	anomalies	in	the	system	that	could	
jeopardize	 the	 performance	 and/or	 integrity	 of	 the	machines.	 This	 system	works	
automatically,	 i.e.	 there	 is	no	need	 for	maintenance	engineers	 to	monitor	 the	data	
continuously.	 Only	 when	 the	 system	 detects	 an	 issue	 with	 the	 health	 of	 the	
locomotive,	 an	 alert	 is	 sent	 to	 CM	 experts	 for	 further	 investigation	 and	
recommendation	 of	 action	 to	 the	 locomotive	 operator.	 Moreover,	 the	 diagnosis	
system	 is	 always	 evolving	 to	 become	 more	 accurate	 by	 being	 updated	 with	
important	 information	 from	 the	 customer	 and	 repair	 shop	 after	 the	 inspection	 or	
repairs	 are	 performed,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 comparing	 the	 failure	 diagnosed	with	 the	
actual	condition	of	equipment.	
2.3.3 Power Generation 
The	 power	 generation	 industry	 is	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 the	 price	 of	 commodities,	
and	energy	demand.	Based	on	these	two	factors,	operations	in	power	plants	are	not	
constant;	operators	must	adapt	their	processes	continuously	to	find	a	good	balance	
between	demand	and	 supply.	 For	 example,	 at	 periods	of	 high	demand,	 companies	
can	 operate	 their	 turbines	 at	 high	 capacity	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 demand.	 Another	
important	 aspect	 is	 that	 electricity	 must	 always	 be	 available,	 i.e.	 power	 outages	
should	be	avoided	at	all	cost.	For	this	reason,	power	plants	have	to	have	very	high	
reliability	levels.	
In	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	 issues	mentioned	 above,	 the	 power	 generation	 industry	
has	 made	 significant	 contributions	 to	 the	 development	 of	 new	 techniques	 for	
equipment	surveillance.	In	the	last	decades,	the	efforts	towards	improving	CM	have	
concentrated	 mostly	 in	 diagnosis	 and	 failure	 prediction	 systems	 using	 advanced	
algorithms,	neural	networks,	expert	systems,	etc.	
One	 novel	 approach	 is	 the	 use	 of	 incremental	 training	 algorithms	 to	 improve	
traditional	 statistical	 model	 for	 failure	 prediction.	 Traditional	 statistical	 models	
compare	 recorded	 data	 (e.g.	 measured	 outlet	 pressure	 on	 a	 gas	 turbine)	 vs.	 an	
estimate.	This	estimate	is	a	value	calculated	by	an	algorithm	based	on	historical	data.	
The	 novelty	 of	 incremental	 training	 algorithms	 is	 that	 it	 not	 only	 relies	 on	 old	
historical	 data	 for	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 normal	 expected	 value	 for	 the	 parameter	
measured,	 but	 it	 updates	 (or	 trains)	 itself	 continuously	 with	 the	 data	 recently	
recorded.	 The	 advantage	 of	 this	 method	 is	 its	 capability	 to	 adapt	 to	 changes	 in	
operational	 behavior	 (caused	 by	 degradation	 of	 components).	 One	 of	 the	
disadvantages	 of	 incremental	 training	 algorithms	 is	 that	 they	 require	 periodical	
assessment	 from	 technical	 experts	 to	 validate	 normal	 and	 abnormal	 trends;	
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however,	 these	 interventions	 tend	 to	 reduce	 in	 frequency	over	 time	as	 the	system	
“learns”	[20].	
Another	trend	seen	in	the	power	generation	industry	is	the	use	of	Artificial	Neural	
Networks	 (ANN)	 for	 modeling	 production	 of	 pools	 of	 power	 plants	 to	 maximize	
production.	ANN	models	help	operators	to	decide	the	optimal	compromise	between	
maintenance	 interventions,	 power	 generation	 levels	 and	 plant	 utilization	 during	 a	
given	time	period.	Conventional	physical	models	can	 lead	to	 long	calculation	times	
and	high	CPU	usage	due	 to	 the	 large	amount	 iterations	needed.	ANN	reduces	CPU	
processing	time	and	occupancy	considerably	[21].	ANN	modeling	allows	combining	
evaluation	of	power	plant	 condition	with	 economical	 impact	 evaluation	 caused	by	
future	degradation	or	faults	predicted.	
2.3.4 Aerospace 
For	 obvious	 safety	 reasons,	 a	 flying	 vehicle	 cannot	 afford	 failure	 of	 its	 critical	
components	at	any	time	during	flight.	This	is	why	aerospace	is	one	of	the	industries	
where	CM	is	most	advanced.	
Adaptive	Gaussian	Threshold	(ATA)	Algorithm	is	one	novel	concept	in	aerospace	for	
failure	detection	when	historical	information	is	scarce.	This	methodology	is	able	to	
recognize	new	behavior	patterns	 that	were	not	considered	during	the	modeling	of	
machine	failure.	The	system	creates	normal	operation	parameter	thresholds	for	new	
conditions	based	on	features	that	represent	normal	condition	and	check	the	results	
when	new	data	is	obtained.	
The	 National	 Aeronautics	 and	 Space	 Administration	 (NASA)	 is	well	 known	 for	 its	
strong	research	and	development	program.	Together	with	its	subcontractors,	NASA	
has	developed	many	cutting	edge	technologies	used	today	in	the	aerospace	field	and	
many	of	these	inventions	have	been	exported	to	other	industries	as	well.	NASA	uses	
most	of	the	common	CM	techniques	such	as	vibration	monitoring,	Non‐Destructive	
Tests	 (NDT)	 and	 lubricant	 analysis,	 but	 they	 also	 work	 with	 other	 less	 common	
monitoring	methods,	such	as	infrared	thermography,	ultrasonic	noise	detection	and	
electrical	CM	[39].	
In	addition	 to	 the	advanced	predictive	 testing	and	 inspection	 technologies	used	at	
NASA,	 the	 agency	 has	 also	 made	 some	 contribution	 to	 equipment	 diagnosis	 and	
failure	trending	software.	 	Traditionally,	physical	models	were	used	to	monitor	the	
health	of	the	equipment	onboard	space	vehicles.	However,	as	technology	advanced	
these	models	 needed	 an	 immense	 computing	 capacity	 in	 order	 to	 perform,	which	
makes	the	system	very	complex.	In	an	effort	to	improve	the	models,	NASA	and	one	
of	 its	 contractors	developed	 software	 for	CM	 trending	 and	 failure	prediction.	This	
new	 program	 uses	 a	 hybrid	 physical	 model	 that	 combines	 simplified	 analytical	
model	 and	 classical	 analysis	 techniques	 to	 provide	 diagnosis,	 prognosis,	 and	
decision	 support	 [22].	When	 compared	 to	 traditional	 physical	models,	 this	 hybrid	
model	has	the	following	advantages:	
 Allows	for	real‐time	or	near	real	time	diagnosis	
 Earlier	identification	of	degradation	symptoms	
 Low	CPU	usage	
 Considerably	lower	number	of	false	alarms	
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The	 software	 is	 currently	 used	 in	 the	 aerospace	 industry	 only,	 but	 it	 has	 a	 great	
potential	 to	 be	 used	 in	 other	 areas	 such	 as	 medical,	 process	 plants,	 power	
generation,	etc.	
2.3.5 Discussion 
In	the	 last	 two	decades	we	have	seen	a	rapid	growth	and	development	of	new	CM	
techniques	and	applications.	However,	many	of	the	methods	used	in	the	industries	
aforementioned	 are	 still	 being	 developed	 for	 subsea	 applications.	 Due	 to	 the	
stringent	requirements	for	underwater	technology,	new	sensors	have	to	go	through	
severe	 qualification	 programs	 before	 they	 can	 be	 used.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 has	 not	
been	 a	 showstopper	 for	 many	 of	 the	 CM	 equipment	 providers	 and	 many	 new	
sensors	 for	 subsea	 applications	 have	 been	 launched	 during	 the	 past	 5	 years.	
Development	 of	 complex	 underwater	 systems	 such	 as	 Ormen	 Lange	 subsea	
compression,	 and	 installations	 in	 remote	 locations	 such	as	 the	Snohvit	 field	 in	 the	
Barents	 Sea	 have	 also	 been	 a	 significant	 driver	 for	 the	 conception	 of	 new	
measurement	technologies.	
The	 most	 important	 trend	 in	 CM	 is	 by	 far	 the	 use	 of	 Artificial	 Intelligence	 (AI)	
methods,	such	as	Neural	Networks	and	Fuzzy	logic.	Normally	a	standard	SPS	has	a	
modern	 control	 system	 that	 collects	 huge	 amounts	 of	 data	 about	 the	 process	
instruments	 located	 subsea.	The	 challenge	 is	 to	use	 this	data	 in	 the	most	effective	
way	to	determine	equipment	condition	and	predict	 failures,	and	AI	techniques	can	
do	exactly	that.	
2.4 Condition monitoring techniques currently used in subsea 
Even	though	subsea	systems	have	existed	for	more	50	years,	it	was	only	a	few	years	
ago	that	Oil	and	Gas	(O&G)	companies	have	considered	CM	for	subsea	equipment	as	
an	essential	part	of	 their	 asset	management	 strategies.	OEMs	have	 taken	different	
approaches,	but	all	of	them	have	the	same	goals:	to	increase	reliability,	reduce	NPT,	
maximize	production	and	minimize	Life	Cycle	Cost	(LCC).	In	this	section	an	overview	
about	what	subsea	OEMs	are	doing	with	respect	to	CM	is	presented	along	with	the	
latest	developments	done	by	researchers	and	instrumentation	manufacturers.	
2.4.1 Subsea equipment manufacturers’ approach to condition monitoring 
In	 2009	 General	 Electric	 (GE)	 launched	 the	 Subsea	 Monitoring	 and	 Remote	
Technology	 Center	 (SMARTCenter),	 which	 is	 an	 operation	 hub	 located	 in	 the	 UK	
where	they	monitor	remotely	subsea	production	systems	around	the	world.	In	this	
technology	 center	 a	 team	of	 engineers	perform	 remote	 fault	 diagnosis,	 equipment	
performance	trending	and	provide	recommendations	for	maintenance	intervention	
and	 valuable	 information	 to	 flow	 assurance	 engineers.	 The	 SMARTcenter	 is	 also	
connected	 to	 other	 GE’s	 center	 of	 excellence	 around	 the	 globe,	 allowing	 further	
collaboration	 between	 GE	 experts	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 maintenance	 engineers	 other	
locations.	 Some	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 technology	 center	 are	 quicker	 response	 to	
issues	with	equipment	failures,	alarms	and	trends;	reduced	number	of	trips	offshore	
which	then	translates	 into	 lower	mobilization	costs	and	 increased	efficiency	 in	the	
use	of	internal	resources	[23,	24].	Some	of	the	parameters	monitored	by	GE	are:	
 Hydraulic	leakage	
 Umbilical	resistance	degradation	
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 Choke	erosion	(estimation)	
 Valve	signature	
 Communication	and	power	
Framo	Engineering	 (a	Schlumberger	company),	 supplier	of	 subsea	pumps	has	also	
opened	 an	 online	 support	 center	 for	 CM.	 They	 have	 called	 it	 FRIEND	 (FRamo	
Interactive	ENabling	Diagnostics).	This	 center	 is	 located	 in	Bergen,	Norway	where	
they	 can	 do	 remote	 surveillance	 of	 subsea	 pumps	 continuously	 and	 create	
performance	 trends	 to	 optimize	 production,	 troubleshooting	 and	 predict	 failures.	
The	 system	works	 by	 transmitting	 subsea	 operational	 data	 in	 real‐time	 from	 the	
topside	 facility	 to	 the	support	center	via	satellite,	where	the	data	 is	processed	and	
analyzed	by	Framo	engineers,	while	at	the	same	time	the	data	can	be	visualized	by	
the	end	user	via	internet	interface.	
In	 addition,	 the	 system	 has	 an	 automated	 alarm	 system	 that	 notifies	 Framo	
engineers	 on	 duty	 of	 abnormal	 situations	 for	 further	 action.	 One	 of	 the	 most	
interesting	features	of	FRIEND	is	the	possibility	for	the	end	user	to	access	a	virtual	
workspace	 where	 they	 can	 access	 the	 information	 about	 the	 subsea	 system	
operating	 conditions	 in	 real	 time,	 export	 data,	 access	maintenance	 data,	 generate	
reports,	and	request	spare	parts	[25].	
Another	 novel	 approach	 taken	 by	 Framo	 and	 Schlumberger	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 their	
SCM	(named	subC‐pod)	to	connect	future	sensors	without	need	for	reconfiguration	
of	 the	 system,	 just	 “plug	 in	 and	 play”.	 This	 is	 achieved	 by	 adding	 connectivity	 for	
external	sensors	(e.g.	sand	detector)	through	switchable	24VDC	power	supplies	and	
by	 adding	 the	 new	 sensors	 automatically	 to	 the	 subsea	 communication	 network.	
Data	 transmission	 to	 the	 topside	 facility	 is	done	by	 fiber	optic	 cable,	which	allows	
high‐speed	 communications,	 up	 to	 100	 MB/s,	 but	 most	 importantly	 it	 avoids	
electromagnetic	 interference	 normally	 caused	 by	 high	 voltage	 transmission	 in	 the	
umbilical	needed	for	subsea	pumps	[26].	
Schlumberger	(SLB),	a	company	that	provide	downhole	sensors	and	subsea	control	
modules	 among	 many	 other	 products,	 offers	 a	 parallel	 surveillance	 system	 that	
allows	to	monitor	and	control	SPS’s	together	with	wellbore	equipment.	The	system	
depicted	in	Figure	2‐6,	 is	comprised	of	a	subsea	control	module	that	monitors	and	
operates	 the	XT	and	an	additional	 control	module	 and	communication	hub	 (subC‐
net)	for	the	downhole	sensors	and	valves	[27].	This	system	allows	for	integration	of	
sensors	used	in	different	applications	from	different	vendors,	for	further	processing	
by	the	MCS	and	transmission	to	an	onshore	operation	center.	
Another	 CM	 service	 offered	 by	 Schlumberger	 is	 integrity	 surveillance	 of	 risers,	
flowlines	 and	 jumpers;	 detection	 of	 leaks	 and	 distributed	 temperatures	
measurements	for	hydrate	prediction.	
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Aker	Solutions	has	also	made	some	developments	in	CM	of	subsea	equipment.	It	has	
its	own	e‐field	program,	which	is	based	on	surveillance	of	instrumentation,	analysis	
of	data,	operational	optimization	and	advanced	control	through	intervention	in	real	
time,	 and	 remote	 operations	 [28].	 The	 information	 about	 this	 system	 available	
publicly	is	very	limited	and	therefore	cannot	be	discussed	in	detail	in	this	report.	
FMC	 has	 CM	 program	 for	 subsea	 equipment	 as	 well:	 Condition	and	Performance	
Monitoring	 (CPM).	 This	 system	 monitors	 electrical	 and	 mechanical	 components	
continuously	 and	 provides	 real‐time	 processing	 to	 determine	 current	 operating	
conditions	 and	 early	 detection	 of	 degradation	 and‐or	 reduced	 efficiency	 [16].	 The	
CPM	program,	which	uses	the	Technical	Condition	Index	(TCI)	explained	in	section	
2.3.1	as	the	main	tool	for	asset	diagnosis,	is	divided	in	4	main	process	areas:	
Monitor	and	report:	 the	 equipment	 is	monitored;	 abnormal	 trends	are	 identified	
(TCI)	and	reported	in‐real	time	to	FMC	onshore	operation	center	and	customer.	
Diagnosis,	advice	and	alert:	a	 full	 diagnostic	 is	 developed	 by	 FMC	with	possible	
assistance	 from	 the	 end	 user	 and/or	 experts	 located	 remotely,	 then	 appropriate	
maintenance	action	is	suggested.	
Recover	 and	 maintain:	 the	 maintenance	 activities	 are	 carried	 out	 and	 related	
information	is	entered	in	a	database	for	future	reference	
Knowledge	Management:	condition	and	defects	on	the	equipment	are	compared	to	
the	 initial	 failure	analysis	 to	 corroborate	 the	prediction	and	 then	 the	TCI	model	 is	
updated	based	on	the	findings.	
FMC	 also	 uses	 some	 advanced	 technologies	 for	 equipment	 surveillance	 such	 as,	
optoelectronic	 leak	 detection	 based	 on	 fluorescence	 spectroscopy.	 This	 system	 is	
	
Figure	2‐6	‐	Schlumberger	parallel	surveillance	system	[27]		
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based	on	the	principle	that	different	substances	absorb	more	or	less	light	depending	
on	their	composition.	An	arrange	of	LED	lamps	emit	light,	record	the	light	reflected	
and	 determine	 if	 the	 there	 are	 any	 substances	 other	 than	 seawater	 around	 the	
instrument.	 	 Since	 hydrocarbons	 and	 hydraulic	 fluids	 have	 specific	 fluorescence	
signatures,	 the	 detection	 system	 can	 be	 calibrated	 for	 the	 liquids	 present	 in	 the	
particular	equipment	monitored,	which	allows	the	sensors	to	detect	very	small	leaks.	
The	radius	of	detection	reaches	up	to	5m,	making	it	 ideal	for	monitoring	of	subsea	
trees,	 templates	 and	manifolds.	 Other	 benefits	 are:	 low	 power	 consumption,	 long	
lifespan	of	the	lamps,	low	probability	of	false	alarms,	qualified	for	water	depths	up	
to	3000m	and	small	 footprint.	As	an	option,	 the	system	can	be	fitted	with	a	digital	
camera	 that	 allows	 confirming	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 leak	 detected	 by	 the	 sensors,	
without	the	need	to	use	ROVs	for	this	purpose	[29,	30].	
A	summary	of	the	sensor	technologies	and	prognosis/diagnosis	systems	used	by	the	
main	subsea	equipment	providers	is	presented	in	Table	2‐1.		
	
Table	2‐1	‐	CM	technologies	used	by	major	subsea	equipment	suppliers	
Technology	 GE	 Framo	 FMC	 Aker	 SLB	
Monitoring	Technology	  	 	 	 	 	
Acoustic	leak	detector	 ✓	 X	 X	 N/A*	 X	
Fiber‐Bragg	Grating	 X	 X	 X	 N/A*	 ✓	
Optoelectronic	leak	detection	
system	
X	 X	 ✓	 X	 X	
Fault	Diagnosis	and	Prognosis	
System	
	 	 	 	 	
Remote	monitoring	center	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 X	 ✓ 
Internet	portal	for	customer/3rd	
party	access	
N/A*	 ✓	 N/A*	 X	 ✓	
Flow	assurance	support	 ✓	 X	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	
Technical	Condition	Index	 X	 X	 ✓	 X	 X 
Choke	erosion	estimation	 ✓	 X	 ✓	 X	 X	
Valve	signature	analysis	 ✓	 X	 ✓	 X	 X	
	
2.4.2 Latest technologies in subsea sensing technology 
Since	condition	surveillance	of	subsea	equipment	applies	not	only	to	new	equipment,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 have	 non‐intrusive	 products	 that	 can	 be	 installed	 in	 existing	
equipment	 without	 disturbing	 production.	 Norwegian	 company	 ClampOn	 has	
developed	a	series	of	CM	sensors	that	can	be	easily	 installed	by	ROV	and	required	
																																																								
*	N/A:	no	public	information	was	available	by	the	time	this	report	was	written	
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little	to	no	calibration.	The	products	offered	are	sand	monitors,	PIG	detectors,	 leak	
detectors,	vibration	monitors,	and	corrosion‐erosion	monitors.	
The	 most	 common	 way	 to	 avoid	 corrosion	 of	 structures	 is	 by	 using	 cathodic	
protection	 together	 with	 corrosion	 resistant	 materials	 and	 protective	 coatings.	
Cathodic	 protection	 is	 designed	 for	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 field	 and	 is	 normally	 very	
reliable,	 but	 needs	 to	 be	monitored	 to	 make	 sure	 it	 works	 as	 expected.	 Cathodic	
protection	is	monitored	by	using	permanent	mounted	sensors	(see	Figure	2‐7a)	that	
provide	 readout	 of	 the	 anodes	 performance,	 or	 by	measuring	 cathodic	 protection	
potentials	of	the	anode	using	a	contact	probe	handled	by	ROV	(see	Figure	2‐7b).	[31]	
Another	 Norwegian	 company,	 NAXYS,	 offers	 an	 innovative	 solution	 for	 leak	 and	
vibration	monitoring	 of	 subsea	 pipelines,	 structures	 and	 equipment.	 The	 product	
shown	in	Figure	2‐8	is	called	the	Acoustic	Leak	and	Vibration	Detector	(ALVD)	and	is	
installed	 on	 subsea	 structures	 (templates	 and	 manifolds).	 The	 equipment	 uses	
hydrophones	 arranged	 in	 three	 dimensions	 to	 record	 acoustic	 signals,	 compare	
them	with	baseline	signatures	for	leak	and	vibration	and	then	it	generates	an	alarm	
in	 case	 of	 a	 deviation	 between	 the	 baseline	 and	 value	 measured.	 This	 system	 is	
planned	to	be	 installed	 in	 the	subsea	compressor	 in	Ormen	Lange	[32].	One	of	 the	
limitations	of	using	hydrophones	to	detect	leaks	is	that	they	can	only	detect	medium	
to	 large	 size	 leaks.	 When	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 system	 requires	 more	 accurate	 leak	
detection	(small	leaks),	Moodie	et	al.	[29]	recommend	using	a	fluorescence	detection	
system.	[33]	
	 	
   	
a)	ROV‐operated	probe		 	 	 b)	Permanent	monitoring	panel	
Figure	2‐7	‐	Cathodic	protection	monitoring	systems	[31]	
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A	novel	non‐intrusive	method	for	CM	in	underwater	applications	is	the	use	of	Fiber‐
Bragg	 Grating	 (FBG)	 sensor.	 This	 technology	 uses	 fiber	 optic	 to	 measure	
temperature,	pressure	and	strain	on	the	equipment.	Based	on	these	measurements,	
one	can	determine	vibration,	fatigue,	temperature	and	pressure	of	production	fluids	
and	 pipe	 bending.	 FBG	works	 by	 the	 principle	 of	 Freshnel	 reflection,	 where	 light	
travelling	through	optical	fiber	reflect	some	wavelengths	and	transmit	all	the	others.	
Changes	 in	temperature	or	strain	experienced	by	the	 fiber,	affect	 its	striations	and	
consequently	 the	 amount	 of	 light	 reflected,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 calculate	
temperature,	pressure	and	strain	experienced	by	the	equipment	where	the	sensors	
are	mounted.	This	technology	has	many	advantages	over	conventional	sensors:	it	is	
non‐intrusive,	does	not	 require	periodic	calibration,	 it	 can	be	 integrated	 to	SCADA	
systems,	it	is	corrosion	resistant,	sensors	are	small,	it	is	simple	to	use	and	it	has	very	
low	signal	loss	over	very	long	distances.		Recently,	FBG	sensors	were	being	used	as	
support	 for	 flow	 assurance,	 since	 they	 can	 provide	 temperature	 and	 pressure	
profiles	 along	 pipelines	 and	 risers	 with	 great	 accuracy	 allowing	 flow	 assurance	
engineers	 to	 predict	 and	detect	 hydrate	 formation	 [34].	 There	 are	many	uses	 and	
potential	benefits	of	the	FBG	technology	[35],	as	shown	in	Table	2‐2.	
	 	
	
Figure	2‐8	‐	NAXIS	acoustic	leak	and	vibration	detector	[33]	
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Table	2‐2	‐	Applications	and	benefits	of	FBG	sensors	
Type	of	Measurement	 Application	 Potential	Benefits	
Temperature	and	
pressure	profile	
Accurate	monitoring	
state	of	the	system	
Good	visibility	of	process	conditions	
Detect	insulation	degradation	
Reduce	use	of	inhibitor	during	shut‐
in/restart	operations	
Trends	and	changes	
in	the	temperature	
profile	
Infer	solid	deposition	 Detect	cold	spots	
More	efficient	use	of	hydrate	inhibitor	
Thinner	insulation	required	(if	FBG	
sensors	are	considered	in	original	
design	of	new	installations)	
Optimization	of	pigging	frequency	
Strain	 Riser	fatigue	
monitoring	
Prediction	of	riser	failure	
Vibration	 Slug	detection	 Better	flow	assurance	control	
2.5 Subsea Production Systems 
The	 international	 standardization	organization	 [36]	describes	 a	 SPS	as	 the	 system	
and	subsystems	“necessary	to	produce	hydrocarbons	from	one	or	more	subsea	wells	
and	 transfer	 them	 to	a	given	processing	 facility	 located	offshore	 (fixed,	 floating	or	
subsea)	 or	 onshore,	 or	 to	 inject	water/gas	 through	 subsea	wells”.	A	 typical	 SPS	 is	
illustrated	in	Figure	2‐9.	
A	SPS	is	comprised	of	the	following	elements:	
 Subsea	Christmas	tree(s)	
 Production	control	system.	Typical	system	breakdown	for	Electro	Hydraulic	
Multiplex	type:	
 Subsea	Control	Module	(SCM)	
 Hydraulic	Power	Unit	(HPU)*		
 Electrical	Power	Unit	(EPU)*	
 Master	Control	Station	(MCS)*	
 Umbilical(s)	 for	 electrical	 power,	 electrical	 signal,	 hydraulic	 power,	
service	fluids	and	chemicals*	
 Umbilical	terminations	assemblies	(topside	and	subsea)	
 Subsea	Distribution	Unit	(SDU)	
 Wellhead	system(s)	including	associated	casing	strings	
																																																								
*	Located	topside	
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 Template	or	structure	for	supporting	subsea	equipment	
 Manifold(s)	
 Instrumentation	
 Subsea	processing	equipment*	
 Separator	
 Compressor	
 Pump	
 Flowlines	and	tie‐in	spools*	
 Risers*	
 Pig	launcher/receiver*	
 HIPPS	
 Electrical	Flying	Leads	(EFL)	
 Hydraulic	Flying	Leads	(HFL)	
	
																																																								
*	Out	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis	
	
Figure	2‐9	‐	Typical	subsea	production	system	
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SPS’s	can	have	many	configurations,	 from	stand‐alone	wellhead	and	XT	to	satellite	
fields	to	full	subsea	developments	including	manifolds,	subsea	pumps,	compressors	
and/or	separation	system.	In	many	cases	various	pieces	of	equipment	are	provided	
by	different	suppliers,	and	therefore	sensors	and	instruments	must	be	compatible	so	
they	can	be	integrated	into	a	single	CM	program.	One	way	to	achieve	this	integration	
is	 by	 using	 sensors,	 instruments	 and	 control	 systems	 that	 follow	 Subsea	
Instrumentation	 Interface	Standardization	(SIIS)	guidelines.	SIIS	 is	a	 joint	 industry	
project	 created	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 developing	 a	 standard	 interface	 between	 subsea	
control	module	and	subsea	sensors.	Monitoring	systems	based	on	SIIS	use	CANopen	
communication	protocol	as	the	standard	for	supervision,	remote	control,	shut	down	
and	data	transfer.	
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3 Methodology for implementation of condition monitoring 
program for subsea production systems 
The	main	purpose	of	 this	section	 is	 to	provide	guidelines	 to	set	up	an	appropriate	
CM	 program	 for	 subsea	 production	 systems	with	 particular	 focus	 on	 subsea	 XTs,	
subsea	control	modules,	manifolds,	electrical/hydraulic	flying	leads	and	templates.	
There	are	several	ISO	standards	[5,	6,	8]	related	to	condition	monitoring	that	have	
been	 studied	 to	 create	 this	 methodology.	 The	 result	 is	 the	 procedure	 shown	 in	
Figure	 3‐1,	 where	 the	 key	 points	 of	 these	 standards	 have	 been	 condensed	 into	 a	
single	flowchart	to	facilitate	the	process	of	implementing	a	CM	program	for	subsea	
production	systems.	
This	step‐by‐step	procedure	has	to	be	carried	out	individually	for	all	the	subsystems	
in	 the	 SPS	 until	 all	 the	 equipment	 to	 be	monitored	 have	 been	 analyzed.	 Once	 the	
evaluation	is	complete,	a	display	system	must	be	designed	for	the	system	as	a	whole	
to	present	the	data	analyzed	by	the	CM	system.	
This	 methodology	 is	 based	 on	 industry	 standards	 [5‐8,	 37,	 38];	 however,	 the	
techniques	 described	 in	 these	 documents	 are	 intended	 for	 onshore	 or	 surface	
rotating	 machinery.	 Consequently,	 the	 guidelines	 presented	 herein	 have	 been	
tailored	for	subsea	equipment.	
The	methodology	is	divided	in	five	major	blocks:	system	classification,	measurement,	
data	 acquisition	 and	 processing,	 diagnosis	 and	 prognosis,	 and	 advisory	 generation.	
The	steps	involved	in	each	block	are	explained	in	the	following	pages.	
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Figure	3‐1	‐	Flowchart	for	implementing	a	condition	monitoring	program	
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3.1 System classification 
3.1.1 Equipment hierarchy levels 
The	 first	 step	necessary	 to	 implement	a	CM	program	 is	 to	divide	 the	system	to	be	
monitored	 into	 subsystems	 and	 organize	 them	 by	 levels	 of	 hierarchy.	 This	
classification,	also	known	as	system	architecture,	will	allow	for	better	identification	
of	 the	 equipment	 to	 be	 analyzed	 in	 the	 next	 stage.	 Appendix	 A	 shows	 a	 detailed	
breakdown	of	a	typical	SPS	into	subsystems	at	equipment	hierarchy	levels.		
3.1.2 Determine equipment/subsystem to be analyzed 
Once	all	the	pieces	of	the	equipment	have	been	classified	and	organized	by	hierarchy	
level,	 choose	 the	 first	 subsystem	 to	 be	 evaluated.	 The	 level	 of	 detail	 at	which	 the	
subsystem	 will	 be	 assessed	 will	 vary	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 maintainable	
characteristics	of	the	equipment.	For	instance,	for	manifolds	it	is	recommendable	to	
study	the	equipment	down	to	level	2	(refer	to	appendix	A)	because	that	will	provide	
enough	 information	 of	 the	 failure	 cause,	 whereas	 for	 electrical	 components	 it	 is	
better	to	analyze	the	equipment	to	the	lowest	level.	
3.2 Measurement 
Perform	a	comprehensive	equipment	assessment	that	will	allow	the	user	to	find	the	
most	 appropriate	 techniques	 for	 condition	 monitoring	 of	 the	 system.	 The	
assessment	 is	 achieved	 by	 doing	 a	 Failure	Mode	 and	 Symptoms	 Analysis	 (FMSA),	
which	 is	a	variation	 to	 the	Failure	Modes,	Effects	and	Criticality	Analysis	 (FMECA)	
technique	widely	used	in	reliability	engineering.	The	output	of	 the	FMSA	is	a	 table	
where	the	information	presented	in	the	following	pages	is	populated	in	a	table.	
3.2.1 Identification of equipment and function 
This	 is	 the	first	step	of	 the	FMSA,	 to	 identify	the	subsystem	and	components	to	be	
analyzed	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	 failure	modes	and	 failure	mechanisms	better.	
Describe	 the	 main	 function	 of	 the	 system	 and	 subsystems.	 General	 arrangement	
drawings	and	exploded	views	of	the	equipment	can	be	useful	for	visualization	of	the	
system.	
3.2.2 Failure modes and causes 
Use	of	reliability	data	available	 is	recommended	to	 find	the	possible	 failure	modes	
and	 causes	 in	 SPS’s.	 Several	 sources	 are	 used	 for	 this	 purpose:	 OREDA	 database,	
Cameron	 internal	 reliability	 database	 DRACAS	 and	 Cameron	 internal	 field	
performance	 report	 system.	 The	 OREDA	 database	 is	 a	 project	 that	 originated	 in	
Norway	to	compile	and	exchange	offshore	reliability	data	from	different	oil	and	gas	
operators	 around	 the	 world.	 Access	 to	 the	 database	 is	 restricted	 only	 to	 the	
operating	companies	participating	in	the	program,	but	since	Cameron	is	one	of	the	
main	contributors	to	the	subsea	equipment	database,	OREDA	has	granted	access	to	
Cameron	equipment	data	to	be	used	in	this	report.	
The	 three	 database	 systems	 mentioned	 above	 provide	 a	 good	 overview	 of	 the	
majority	 of	 failure	 modes	 expected	 in	 a	 SPS;	 however,	 the	 information	 collected	
from	 the	 databases	 should	 not	 be	 used	 blindly.	 Expert	 judgment	 should	 be	
considered	to	get	the	most	out	of	the	data	available	and	to	spot	possible	errors.	
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Failure	 modes	 can	 be	 related	 to	 fatigue,	 wear,	 ageing,	 overload,	 corrosion,	
environment,	equipment	misuse	or	a	combination	of	these	factors.	
3.2.3 Failure symptoms 
Identifies	the	symptoms	that	allows	for	detection	of	the	failure	modes	and	that	can	
be	 used	 to	 diagnose	 the	 health	 of	 the	 system.	 Symptoms	 can	 be	 related	 to	 the	
equipment,	for	example	high	voltage	on	a	circuit	board	in	the	SCM;	or	to	the	process,	
for	instance	low	process	fluid	pressure.	
Sometimes	it	 is	not	so	obvious	to	identify	the	symptoms	that	reflect	failure	modes.	
Designers	 of	 the	 CM	 system	 have	 to	 think	 “outside	 the	 box”	 to	 determine	 those	
measurements	 that	 will	 provide	 the	 information	 needed	 about	 the	 health	 of	 the	
system.	
3.2.4 Methods of detection 
List	 the	 possible	 methods	 of	 detection	 for	 each	 symptom.	 A	 symptom	 can	 be	
detected	by	one	or	several	methods,	but	could	also	be	undetectable.	The	methods	of	
detection	 should	 be	 specific	 and	 include	 the	 type	 of	 instrument/sensor	 used	 (e.g.	
acoustic	leak	detector).	
Detection	of	 failure	 symptoms	can	be	done	by	direct	or	 indirect	measurement.	An	
example	 of	 indirect	 measurement	 is	 the	 monitoring	 of	 choke	 erosion.	 To	 access	
inside	 of	 a	 subsea	 choke	 to	 measure	 its	 degradation	 is	 not	 possible	 (or	 at	 least	
practical)	without	 stopping	production	and	bringing	 the	 choke	 to	 the	 surface.	The	
solution	 to	 this	 problem	 is	 to	 estimate	 the	 erosion	 level	 by	measuring	differential	
pressure	 across	 the	 valve,	 flow	 rate	 and	 choke	 position,	 and	 see	 if	 there	 are	 any	
changes	over	time	that	could	be	attributed	to	degradation	of	the	internal	parts.	
3.2.5 Measurement location 
Define	where	the	best	place	to	take	the	measurement	is	within	the	system	so	as	to	
produce	the	most	reliable	data.	Subsea	systems	are	composed	of	a	large	number	of	
components	 installed	 over	 a	 small	 area	 and	 sometimes	 the	 space	 for	 additional	
instruments	 is	 limited;	 therefore,	 this	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration	 when	
determining	the	location	of	the	measurement/transducer.	
Sometimes	it	 is	not	possible	or	economically	feasible	to	place	the	sensor	exactly	at	
the	 source.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 sensor	 can	 be	 installed	 as	 closely	 as	 possible	 to	 the	
desired	 measurement	 location,	 and	 the	 parameter	 at	 the	 desired	 position	 can	 be	
calculated	by	modeling	the	parameter	drift	over	distance.	An	example	of	the	latter	is	
the	measurement	 of	 fluid	 temperature	 in	 a	 flowline:	 By	 installing	 a	 non‐intrusive	
temperature	 sensor	 on	 the	 outer	wall	 of	 a	 pipe,	 and	 then	 calculating	 the	 internal	
temperature	taking	into	account	thermal	losses	through	the	pipe	wall.	
3.2.6 Frequency of monitoring 
Determine	 how	 frequently	 the	 system	 should	 take	 the	 measurements.	 For	 most	
subsea	 applications	 the	 monitoring	 is	 continuous,	 since	 periodic	 monitoring	 (e.g.	
ROV	 visual	 inspection)	 can	 very	 expensive	 and	 support	 vessels	 are	 not	 always	
readily	available.		
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3.2.7 Rating 
In	 order	 to	 compare	 the	 different	monitoring	methods	 previously	 registered	 they	
have	to	be	rated	based	on	their	efficiency	for	detection,	diagnosis	and	prognosis,	as	
well	as	the	severity	of	the	failure.	
3.2.7.1 Detection 
This	 indicator	 gives	 an	 idea	 of	 how	good	 the	 technique	 is	 in	 detecting	 the	 failure,	
regardless	of	how	well	the	failure	can	be	diagnosed	or	prognosticated.	Detection	is	
ranked	from	one	to	five	as	follows:	
1:	There	is	a	remote	probability	that	this	failure	mode	will	be	detected	
2:	There	is	a	low	probability	that	this	failure	mode	will	be	detected	
3:	There	is	a	moderate	probability	that	this	failure	mode	will	be	detected	
4:	There	is	a	high	probability	that	this	failure	mode	will	be	detected	
5:	It	is	certain	that	this	failure	mode	will	be	detected	
3.2.7.2 Severity of failure 
This	 is	 an	 indication	 on	 how	 severe	 the	 consequences	 would	 be	 for	 the	 system,	
environment	and	personnel	 if	a	 failure	were	 to	occur.	The	 four	severity	categories	
are:	
1:	 Any	 event	 that	 could	 cause	 degradation	 of	 system	 performance	 function(s)	
resulting	 in	 negligible	 damage	 to	 either	 the	 system	 or	 its	 environment;	 and	 no	
damage	to	life.	
2:	Any	event	that	degrades	system	performance	function(s)	without	appreciable	
damage	to	system,	environment	or	life;	and	with	minimum	operational	impact.	
3:	Any	event	that	could	potentially	cause	the	loss	of	primary	system	function(s)	
resulting	 in	 considerable	 damage	 to	 the	 system	or	 the	 environment,	 significant	
operating	impact	and/or	negligible	hazard	to	life.	
4:	Any	event	that	could	potentially	cause	the	loss	of	primary	system	function(s)	
resulting	in	serious	damage	to	the	system	or	the	environment	(potential	external	
leakage),	and/or	constituting	a	threat	to	life.	
3.2.7.3 Diagnosis confidence 
This	ranking	reflects	the	degree	of	accuracy	of	the	monitoring	technique	to	diagnose	
the	fault.	It	is	ranked	from	one	to	five	as	follows:	
There	is	a	remote	probability	that	this	failure	mode	diagnosis	is	accurate.	
2:	There	is	a	low	probability	that	this	failure	mode	diagnosis	is	accurate.	
3:	There	is	a	moderate	probability	that	this	failure	mode	diagnosis	is	accurate.	
4:	There	is	a	high	probability	that	this	failure	mode	diagnosis	is	accurate.	
5:	It	is	certain	that	this	failure	mode	diagnosis	will	be	accurate.	
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3.2.7.4 Prognosis confidence 
This	ranking	represents	how	accurate	the	monitoring	technique	is	to	prognosticate	
future	faults.	It	is	categorized	from	one	to	five	as	follows:	
There	is	a	remote	probability	that	this	failure	mode	prognosis	is	accurate.	
2:	There	is	a	low	probability	that	this	failure	mode	prognosis	is	accurate.	
3:	There	is	a	moderate	probability	that	this	failure	mode	prognosis	is	accurate.	
4:	There	is	a	high	probability	that	this	failure	mode	prognosis	is	accurate.	
5:	It	is	certain	that	this	failure	mode	prognosis	will	be	accurate.	
3.2.8 Monitoring Priority Number 
In	 some	 occasions	 a	 failure	 mode	 can	 be	 detected	 by	 different	 methods.	 The	
Monitoring	 Priority	 Number	 (MPN)	 is	 a	 ranking	 system	 used	 to	 determine	which	
monitoring	 technique	 is	 the	 most	 efficient	 based	 on	 the	 four	 criteria	 described	
previously.	The	MPN	calculation	requires	multiplying	all	the	four	rankings,	and	then	
the	technique	with	the	highest	number	is	considered	as	the	optimal	for	the	specific	
failure	mode.	
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3.2.9 Analysis 
Once	the	parameters	that	need	to	be	measured	are	defined,	one	has	to	determine	if	
the	 sensors	 currently	 available	 in	 the	 SPS	 system	 are	 sufficient.	 One	 way	 to	
determine	what	is	currently	measured	is	by	analyzing	the	function	Inputs/Outputs	
(I/O)	schedule	of	the	SCM.	
If	 the	 sensors	 available	 are	 not	 adequate	 for	 failure	 recognition,	 additional	
techniques	 should	 be	 added	 as	 per	 FMSA;	 however,	 this	 has	 to	 be	 considered	
carefully.	 Current	 SPS’s	 have	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 sensors	 already	 embedded	 in	 the	
system,	 especially	 in	 the	 SCM.	 One	 should	 take	 advantage	 of	 these	 existing	 ‐and	
proven‐	 sensors	when	designing	CM	systems	 to	get	 the	most	out	of	 these	devices,	
and	adding	additional	measurements	only	when	it	is	absolutely	necessary.	
The	measurement	equipment	must	be	robust	and	very	reliable;	otherwise	the	use	of	
these	new	sensors	could	add	more	faults	to	the	system.	Other	factors	like	cost,	size,	
installation	method	and	sensitivity	to	external	factors	(e.g.	magnetic	field)	should	be	
considered	as	well.	
3.3 Data acquisition and processing 
3.3.1 Data acquisition 
Before	the	measurements	can	be	used	for	analysis,	the	data	have	to	be	presented	in	
the	proper	 form.	First	 the	 information	given	by	 the	sensors/transducers	has	 to	be	
collected	 and	 the	 analog	 data	 have	 to	 be	 digitized,	 including	 time	 stamp	 and	
information	 about	data	quality.	 It	 is	 highly	 recommended	 to	use	only	 instruments	
that	are	compliant	with	SIIS	(see	section	2.5)	to	simplify	the	interface	with	the	SCM.	
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3.3.2 Data manipulation 
After	the	information	has	been	collected	and	digitized,	the	raw	measurements	have	
to	 be	 converted	 so	 they	 can	 be	 presented	 as	 meaningful	 descriptors	 of	 the	
equipment	 condition.	 This	 manipulation	 of	 data	 can	 be	 signal	 analysis,	 sampling,	
algorithm	calculations,	 feature	 extraction,	 filtering	and	 combination	of	 operational	
parameters	(virtual	sensors),	to	name	a	few	processes.	
3.4 Health assessment, diagnosis and prognosis 
3.4.1 State detection 
The	 way	 faults	 are	 detected	 is	 by	 comparing	 the	 measured	 values	 against	 a	
predefined	baseline.	If	the	values	fall	outside	the	baseline	limits,	the	system	reports	
this	condition	as	an	anomaly	by	the	means	of	an	alert	or	alarm;	otherwise	there	is	no	
action	 taken	 other	 than	 keep	 recording	 the	 data.	 The	 different	warning	 levels	 for	
fault	detection	are	defined	in	Figure	3‐2.		
The	 creation	 of	 the	 baseline	 is	 paramount	 for	 the	 CM	 system	 and	 should	 not	 be	
taken	 lightly.	 To	 determine	 the	 “anomaly	 zone”	 one	 should	 use	 historical	 data,	
experts’	judgment	and	research	figures;	and	then	set	alerts,	alarms	and	trips	levels	
for	 each	 parameter	measured.	Whenever	 possible	 the	 system	 should	 evaluate	 the	
degree	of	the	fault	and	convey	this	information	along	with	the	alert.	
When	the	failure	mechanisms	are	simple	(linear	behavior),	the	detection	of	the	fault	
can	 be	 done	 simply	 by	 comparison	 of	 single	 parameters	 measured	 against	 a	
reference	 value	 (baseline),	 but	when	 the	 system	 gets	more	 complex,	model‐based	
methods	are	used.	Models	allow	interpretation	of	multiple	variables	and/or	complex	
signals	by	using	algorithms.	Different	types	of	models	are	explained	in	section	3.4.4.	
It	 is	also	 important	to	mention	that	baselines	should	be	revisited	and	refined	once	
operation	 commences	 [5],	 to	 calibrate	 the	 system	 for	 possible	 errors	 of	 initial	
assumptions	or	to	correct	for	operational	changes.	
	
Figure	3‐2	‐	Alarm,	trip	and	alert	definitions	
	
Alarm
• An	alarm	is	the	first	indication	that	a	fault	has	occured	and	provides	a	warning	to	the	
operator	advising	that	something	is	wrong	with	the	equipment.
Alert
• The	alert	indicates	an	advanced	state	of	degradation	of	the	equipment	and	is	an	
indication	that	maintenance	activities	should	take	place	ASAP	to	prevent	the	equipment	
from	breaking	down.
Trip
• This	is	the	point	where	the	equipment	cannot	continue	operating	due	to	the	severity	of	
the	failure	and	is	forced	to	shutdown.	This	value	is	ussually	less	than	the	real	break	value	
to	account	for	a	safety	factor	that	prevents	irreversible	damage	or	catastrophic	failure
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3.4.2 Diagnosis 
When	an	anomaly	is	detected,	the	system	should	diagnose	the	fault	and	the	failure,	
as	well	as	determining	the	current	degradation	state	(health)	of	the	equipment.	The	
output	of	the	diagnosis	is	a	characterization	of	the	fault	that	includes,	as	a	minimum,	
an	estimation	of	the	location	of	the	fault,	size	of	the	fault	and	the	time	of	detection	
[39].	 This	 information	 is	 very	 important	 to	 find	 the	 root	 cause	 of	 the	 problem,	 so	
proper	 actions	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 bring	 the	 equipment	 back	 to	 its	 original	 state	 by	
repair,	modification	or	 changing	operational	parameters;	while	providing	valuable	
data	to	prevent	similar	failures	in	the	future.	
In	 order	 to	 understand	how	diagnosis	 systems	work,	 the	 concepts	 of	 fault,	 failure	
and	symptoms	should	be	 clarified.	A	 failure	 is	 a	 condition	 that	 causes	a	 system	 to	
perform	without	achieving	the	expected	results.	A	fault	 is	said	to	be	the	cause	of	a	
failure.	And	a	symptom	is	the	observable	effect	of	a	failure.	
There	are	several	ways	to	diagnose	a	failure,	but	they	could	be	reduced	to	two	main	
forms:	 diagnosis	 models	 based	 on	 symptoms	 and	 models	 based	 on	 equipment	
behavior.	In	the	first	case,	the	diagnosis	system	tries	to	find	all	the	possible	reasons	
(causes)	of	 the	detected	 failure	based	on	 information	available	on	how	the	system	
performs	under	different	circumstances.	Behavioral	models	are	more	complex;	they	
predict	 the	 normal	 behavior	 of	 a	 system	 based	 on	 knowledge	 of	 the	 process	 and	
compare	these	estimated	conditions	with	the	current	parameters	measured	to	see	if	
there	 are	 any	 deviations.	 Both	 approaches	 have	 different	 variations.	 Some	 of	 the	
most	used	models	are	described	in	section	3.4.4.	
Triggering	of	the	diagnosis	system	is	normally	done	automatically	after	the	anomaly	
detection,	but	the	system	should	also	allow	for	occasional	diagnosis	on‐demand.	The	
latter	is	necessary	in	some	specific	scenarios	where	the	operator	suspects	there	can	
be	a	fault	that	has	not	been	detected	by	the	system	or	when	it	 is	required	to	know	
the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 equipment	 for	 reporting	 purposes	 or	 planning	 of	 future	
maintenance	activities.	
3.4.3 Prognosis 
The	main	purpose	of	prognostics	is	to	determine	the	Remaining	Useful	Life	(RUL)	or	
Estimated	Time	To	Failure	(ETTF)	of	the	components	and	to	use	this	information	for	
maintenance	 planning.	 Prognostics	 use	 models	 based	 on	 the	 historical	
measurements	to	generate	trends	that	provide	an	estimation	of	future	degradation	
of	the	equipment.	Estimation	of	RUL	can	be	done	with	great	extent	of	accuracy	for	
components	 subject	 to	 progressive	 deterioration,	 whereas	 for	 parts	 with	 random	
failure	mechanisms	prognosis	can	be	quite	challenging.	
According	to	[6]	the	prognosis	process	has	four	main	parts	and	should	be	developed	
as	follows:	
3.4.3.1 Pre‐processing 
First	the	failure	modes	and	the	way	they	interact	shall	be	identified.	This	is	done	in	
the	 FMSA	 and	 explained	 in	 section	3.2.2.	 Then	 the	 alert,	 alarm	 and	 trip	 levels	 are	
defined.	 Later,	 possible	 future	 failure	modes	 are	 determined	 and,	 lastly	 a	 suitable	
model	for	the	failure	modes	is	selected	
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3.4.3.2 Prognosis of failure modes detected 
Once	a	failure	or	group	of	failures	are	detected,	one	should	assess	the	severity	of	the	
failures	 and	 project	 the	 parameters	 onto	 the	 future	 using	 either	 projection	 or	
extrapolation	methods,	to	predict	their	different	ETTF.	The	failure	with	the	shortest	
ETTF	is	considered	as	the	critical	one	for	the	system	at	current	state.	
3.4.3.3 Prognosis of future failure modes 
Some	 failure	modes	 can	 be	 the	 cause	 of	 other	 problems.	 Based	 on	 current	 failure	
modes	one	should	analyze	the	possible	scenarios	that	could	develop	and	select	the	
future	failure	mode	with	the	shortest	ETTF	as	the	critical	one	for	future	state.	
3.4.3.4 Post action prognosis 
Based	 on	 the	 critical	 failure	 modes	 found	 in	 the	 two	 previous	 steps,	 one	 should	
identify	 the	 maintenance	 actions	 or	 change	 in	 operational	 parameters	 that	 will	
eliminate	or	delay	the	effects	of	the	failure	modes	in	the	system.	Once	the	mitigation	
measures	 have	 been	 identified,	 the	 whole	 prognosis	 process	 should	 be	 repeated	
taking	into	consideration	the	mitigation	actions	as	performed,	to	calculate	the	new	
ETTF	of	the	system.	
3.4.4 Models 
The	most	 common	way	 to	detect	 faults,	determining	 the	health	and	predict	 future	
degradation	of	a	system	or	its	components	is	by	using	models.	Models	for	diagnosis	
can	be	knowledge‐based	or	numerical	and	can	be	subdivided	as	shown	in	Figure	3‐3.	
The	approaches	presented	here	are	some	of	the	most	widely	used	in	fault	detection,	
diagnosis	 and	 prognosis;	 there	 exist	 other	 types	 of	 models	 that	 could	 be	 used,	
especially	 for	 systems	 with	 unique	 characteristics.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	
subsea	 systems	 (without	 rotating	 equipment)	 the	 processes	 and	 components	 are	
usually	 simple	 and	 can	 be	 diagnosed	 with	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 models	 described	
below:		
ۻܗ܌܍ܔܛ	
ە
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓ
۹ܖܗܟܔ܍܌܏܍ െ ܊܉ܛ܍܌ ൞
۴܉ܝܔܜ ܕܗ܌܍ܔ ቊ ۴܉ܝܔܜ/ܛܡܕܘܜܗܕܛ۱܉ܝܛ܉ܔ	ܜܚ܍܍
	۴ܑܚܛܜ	ܘܚܑܖ܋ܑܘܔ܍ܛ	ሺ۾ܗ۴ሻ				
ۼܝܕ܍ܚܑ܋܉ܔ	
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
	
	۴܍܉ܜܝܚ܍	܍ܠܜܚ܉܋ܜܑܗܖ	܉ܖ܌	ܘ܉ܜܜ܍ܚܖ	ܚ܍܋ܗ܏ܖܑܜܑܗܖ
	ۯܚܜܑ܎ܑ܋ܑ܉ܔ	ۼ܍ܝܚ܉ܔ	ۼ܍ܜܟܗܚܓ
	܁ܜ܉ܜܑܛܜܑ܋܉ܔ
۴ܝܢܢܡ	ܔܗ܏ܑ܋	
	۶ܡ܊ܚܑ܌	܉ܘܘܚܗ܉܋ܐ
	
	
Figure	3‐3	–	Types	of	models	
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3.4.4.1 Knowledge‐based models 
Knowledge‐based	models	are	used	 to	predict	health	state	and	 faults	using	a‐priori	
knowledge.	This	approach	requires	having	a	deep	understanding	of	how	the	system	
works,	how	faults	are	generated	and	how	they	evolve	over	time.	Knowledge‐based	
models	provide	qualitative	results	and	work	by	using	rules,	for	instance:	IF	condition	
A	is	met,	THEN	failure	X	occurs.	
Faults/symptoms	 models	 consist	 of	 creating	 fault	 hypotheses	 based	 on	 the	
evaluation	 of	 one	 or	 multiple	 symptoms	 present	 in	 the	 system	 at	 the	 time	 an	
anomaly	 is	 detected.	 The	 hypotheses	 are	 then	 confirmed	 and	 ranked	 by	 their	
probability	of	being	accurate.	
Causal	 tree	 approach	 provides	 more	 information	 about	 the	 fault	 and	 its	
propagation	than	fault/symptoms	models.	The	goal	of	this	method	is	to	find	the	root	
cause	of	the	failure	by	analyzing	existing	failure	modes	using	fault‐tree	diagrams.		
First	principles	models	use	mathematical	simulation	to	predict	the	behavior	of	the	
equipment,	regardless	of	the	state	(healthy	or	faulty)	based	on	process	physics,	such	
as	 energy	 and	 mass	 balances.	 This	 type	 of	 model	 calculates	 physical	 quantities	
without	the	need	for	input	parameters,	but	directly	from	the	laws	of	physics	of	the	
system	 analyzed	 [40].	 In	 condition	 monitoring	 this	 type	 of	 model	 is	 known	 as	
Physics	of	Failure	(PoF).	
3.4.4.2 Numerical models 
Numerical	methods	use	complex	algorithms	to	diagnose	faults	and	do	not	require	in‐
depth	knowledge	of	the	failure	mechanisms.		
Feature	 extraction	 and	 pattern	 recognition	 algorithms	 compare	 a	 set	 of	
predefined	 reference	 signals	 with	 portions	 of	 the	 measured	 signal	 (feature	
extraction)	 then	 try	 to	 find	 similarities	 between	 them	 and	 finally	 classifying	 the	
measured	signal	accordingly	(pattern	recognition)	[40].	
Artificial	Neural	Networks	 are	 systems	 that	 emulate	 the	 way	 the	 human	 brain	
process	 the	 information.	 In	 any	 generic	 system,	 data	 is	 fed	 (input),	 then	 the	
information	is	processed;	whereas	in	an	ANN	the	inputs	are	detected	and	a	desirable	
or	target	output	is	given,	then	based	on	this	information	the	system	calculates	what	
combination	 of	 parameters	 yields	 the	 target	 output	 based	 on	 the	 current	 input.	
Neural	 networks	 are	 used	 in	 fault	 diagnosis	 when	 there	 is	 no	 much	 information	
about	the	process,	the	signals	or	the	fault	patterns	[40].	
Statistical	models	find	changes	in	the	mean	or	variance	of	the	data	measured	based	
on	 assumed	 statistical	 distributions	 of	 the	 parameter	 measured.	 Failures	 usually	
follow	a	specific	density	function	and	therefore	they	can	be	detected	early	by	using	
this	process.	 Statistical	models	are	good	 for	 systems	with	 repetitive	 failures,	 since	
their	failure	distribution	can	be	estimated	relatively	easy.	
Fuzzy	logic	models	are	ruled‐based	(if‐then)	systems	that	use	truth	values	ranging	
from	 0	 to	 1	 to	 describe	 conditions	 as	 opposed	 to	 binary	 (yes/no)	 values	 used	 in	
other	 methods.	 Fuzzy	 models	 are	 particularly	 useful	 when	 failure	 mechanisms	
analyzed	 are	 non‐linear	 since	 it	 uses	 qualitative	 analysis	 that	 incorporate	 expert	
knowledge.	
The	main	pros	and	cons	of	these	models	are	shown	in	Table	3‐1.	
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Table	3‐1	‐	Comparison	of	most	common	models	for	fault	detection,	diagnosis	and	prognosis	
Type	of	model	 Advantages	 Disadvantages	
Knowledge‐based	 	 	
Faults/symptoms	 Does	not	require	complex	
algorithms.	
Little	knowledge	about	failure	
mechanisms	required.	
	
Does	not	provide	in‐depth	
information	about	the	fault	and	its	
propagation.	
	
Casual	tree	 Provides	detailed	information	about	
the	possible	cause	of	the	failure.	
Does	not	require	complex	
algorithms.	
Good	for	fault	isolation.	
It	cannot	find	all	the	possible	failure	
causes.	
Not	practical	to	use	when	failures	
are	state	dependent.	
In‐depth	process	knowledge	
required	to	develop	the	model.	
First	principles	
(Physics	of	failure)	
Limited	amount	of	data	required.	
Good	for	new	designed	complex	
equipment.	
The	knowledge	is	not	dependent	of	
subjective	human	judgment.	
Good	knowledge	of	the	equipment	
behavior	is	obtained.	
	
The	model	is	just	an	approximation	
to	the	real	process.	
Every	piece	of	equipment	requires	a	
separate	model.	
Signals	measured	must	be	highly	
accurate.	
In‐depth	process	knowledge	
required	to	develop	the	model.	
Numerical	 	 	
Neural	network	 Little	influence	by	noise.	
Very	fast	even	for	complex	systems.	
Little	knowledge	about	process,	
signals	and	fault	patterns	is	
required.	
Complex	training	of	the	neural	
network.	
Large	measured	data	sets	are	
required.	
Valid	results	are	confined	to	the	
trained	range.	
Pattern	recognition		 Different	faults	can	be	detected	
independently	from	the	same	signal	
(in	case	of	no	correlation	of	faults).	
Little	process	knowledge	required.	
Little	influence	by	noise.	
Suitable	when	mathematical	models	
for	equipment	are	not	available.	
Fault	measurements	needed.	
In‐depth	knowledge	of	the	sensor	
signal	behavior	required.	
Large	effort	needed	to	build	the	
algorithms.	
Statistical	 Relatively	easy	to	set‐up.	
Provide	accurate	results	for	system	
with	known	mechanism	of	failure	
and	reliability	data.	
Not	good	for	detection	of	rare	
anomalies.	
Requires	large	historical	data.	
Accuracy	depends	on	parameter	
estimators	chosen.	
Fuzzy	logic	 Little	knowledge	about	failure	
mechanisms	required.	
Fast	and	robust	implementation.	
Possibility	to	include	a‐priori	
knowledge	into	the	model.	
Every	piece	of	equipment	requires	a	
separate	model.	
Changes	in	the	system	require	
reprogramming	of	the	model.	
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3.4.4.3 Hybrid models 
When	one	 type	of	model	 cannot	predict	 the	 fault	 and	 state	of	health	of	 a	machine	
with	the	expected	level	of	confidence,	a	combination	of	a	numerical	algorithm	with	a	
knowledge‐based	 model	 is	 recommended.	 This	 hybrid	 approach	 can	 yield	 very	
accurate	 results,	 because	 it	 combines	data	 trends	with	 equipment	behavior,	 but	 it	
must	 be	 noted	 that	 hybrid	 models	 require	 great	 level	 of	 expertise	 in	 both	 SPS	
operation	and	algorithm	conception.	
3.4.4.4 Model recommendation for Cameron subsea production systems 
There	exists	large	reliability	data	both	within	Cameron	and	outside	the	company	(e.g.	
OREDA);	 therefore	 it	 seems	 logical	 to	 use	 statistical	 based	 models	 for	 failure	
detection	 and	 prediction.	Nevertheless,	many	 of	 the	 faults	 in	 a	 subsea	 system	 are	
sporadic,	 which	 makes	 trending	 difficult	 and	 require	 the	 use	 of	 other	
diagnosis/prognosis	methods.	The	author	recommends	the	two	types	of	approaches	
depending	on	the	nature	of	the	failure,	as	described	below.	
For	 mechanical	 components	 is	 advisable	 to	 combine	 statistical	 models	
faults/symptoms	 diagnosis.	 The	 statistical	 method	 will	 cover	 those	 failures	 with	
slow	degradation,	whereas	 the	 fault/symptoms	model	will	discover	 faults	 that	are	
intermittent,	 but	 with	 known	 behaviors.	 For	 most	 mechanical	 components,	 the	
failure	mechanisms	 are	 simple	 and	 known,	 which	makes	 this	 diagnosis	 approach	
ideal.	An	example	of	mechanical	 failure	 is	 the	degradation	of	a	 choke	valve	due	 to	
erosion;	 this	 problem	 can	 be	 noticed	 if	 the	 flow	 rate	 starts	 to	 increase	 but	 the	
pressure	drop	remains	unchanged,	such	that	 it	 is	necessary	to	close	in	the	choke	a	
few	steps	to	maintain	a	set	production	rate.		
Electrical	 failures	 have	 more	 complex	 behavior	 and	 therefore	 should	 be	 treated	
differently.	Since	the	physics	of	failure	are	known	for	most	electrical	components	it	
is	 advisable	 to	 use	 a	 statistical‐PoF	 hybrid	 approach	 for	 fault	 diagnosis	 when	
statistical	data	is	available.	Conversely,	if	the	distribution	of	the	available	data	is	not	
known	or	 the	amount	of	 records	 is	not	sufficient	 (e.g.	new	design),	 the	PoF	model	
can	be	 improved	by	combining	 it	with	ANNs	which	are	 ideal	 for	machine	 learning	
when	historical	 data	 is	 scarce.	 Lastly,	 in	 case	 that	 the	 failure	mechanisms	 are	 not	
known,	it	is	recommended	to	use	a	pattern	recognition	model	instead	of	PoF.	
These	recommendations	are	for	conventional	subsea	production	systems.	For	more	
complex	 architectures	 such	 a	 subsea	 processing,	 compression	 or	 all‐electrical	
systems,	the	use	of	other	approaches	might	be	necessary.	
3.5 Advisory generation 
After	the	diagnosis	and	prognosis	have	been	made,	the	system	should	advise	actions	
required	to	avoid	total	failure	in	the	near	future	and/or	to	extend	the	lifetime	of	the	
equipment.	 The	 recommendations	 provided	 by	 the	 advisory	 generation	 system	
should	be	generated	automatically,	with	the	option	of	manual	 input	from	Cameron	
experts	in	case	of	complex	failure	mechanisms	or	combination	of	them.		
A	decision	support	system	is	the	final	result	of	CM	and	is	key	for	asset	management	
optimization	because	it	provides	the	users	with	a	solution	in	case	of	failure,	i.e.	what	
to	do	when	faults	are	detected?	
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3.6 System display 
Information	 about	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 SPS	 should	 be	 presented	 to	 the	 user	 all	
through	the	monitoring	process,	i.e.	fault	detection,	diagnosis	of	faults,	prediction	of	
future	 degradation	 and/or	 failure,	 and	 maintenance/operational	 advisories.	 The	
information	 shall	 be	 presented	 in	 the	 simplest	 form	 to	 avoid	 confusion	 and	
guarantee	the	issues	are	spotted	correctly	and	quickly	without	need	for	guessing.
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4 Case studies 
To	 illustrate	 the	process	of	 implementing	a	CM	system	 in	a	 conventional	 SPS,	 two	
case	 studies	 are	 presented	 hereafter.	 For	 each	 case	 study	 only	 the	 blocks	 of	
measurement,	 data	 acquisition	 and	 processing,	 and	 diagnosis	 and	 prognosis	 are	
studied	 individually	 because	 these	 are	 the	 only	 blocks	 that	 will	 present	 specific	
information	for	the	system.	The	block	of	system	classification	is	explained	in	section	
3.1,	and	the	block	of	advisory	generation	is	presented	at	the	end	of	the	second	case	
study,	 as	 this	 block	 is	 common	 for	 both	 cases,	 i.e.	 there	 is	 only	 one	 advisory	
generation	system	for	the	whole	SPS.	
An	information	display	system	for	the	SPS	is	recommended	and	described	in	section	
4.4.	Conclusively,	some	commercial	options	for	integration	of	the	CM	system	into	a	
single	software	platform	are	compared	and	discussed.		
4.1 Case study 1: Xmas tree gate valves with hydraulic actuators 
4.1.1 Measurement 
4.1.1.1 Identification of equipment and function 
In	 this	 section	 gate	 valves	 and	 hydraulic	 actuators	 used	 in	 a	 subsea	 XTs	 will	 be	
studied.	The	purpose	of	these	valves	is	to	isolate	and	direct	the	flow	of	hydrocarbons	
or	injection	fluids.	The	majority	of	the	valves	in	a	subsea	XT	are	of	the	gate	type	and	
they	function	either	fully	open	or	fully	closed.	These	valves	are	of	the	fail‐closed	type,	
meaning	 that	 in	 case	 of	 system	 failure	 (e.g.	 loss	 of	 power)	 the	 valves	 move	
automatically	 to	 closed	 position	 to	 avoid	 flow	 through	 the	 system.	 An	 example	 of	
valves	arrangement	in	a	subsea	XT	is	shown	in	Figure	4‐1.	
		
Figure	4‐1	‐	Hydraulic	valves	and	actuators	installed	on	subsea	XT	(source:	Cameron)	
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The	valves	and	actuators	described	herein	operate	 in	 the	 following	manner:	 if	 the	
valve	 needs	 to	 be	 opened,	 pressurized	 hydraulic	 fluid	 is	 sent	 into	 the	 chamber	 to	
push	 the	 actuator.	 Once	 the	 force	 exerted	 by	 the	 actuator	 on	 the	 return	 spring	
overcomes	 the	 opposing	 forces,	 the	 stem	 moves	 inside	 the	 valve	 exposing	 an	
opening	in	the	gate	that	matches	the	opening	in	the	valve	block,	letting	the	fluid	go	
through	(see	Figure	4‐2a).	To	close	the	valve,	the	hydraulic	pressure	is	released	and	
the	spring	force	moves	the	actuator	back	to	its	original	position	(see	Figure	4‐2b).	
4.1.1.2 FMSA 
The	 failure	 modes	 and	 causes	 obtained	 from	 OREDA	 and	 Cameron	 internal	
reliability	databases	are	 listed	 in	 the	FMSA	 in	appendix	B.	For	 the	purpose	of	 this	
thesis	the	FMSA	will	be	done	at	the	subsystem	level.	This	level	of	detail	will	provide	
enough	information	about	the	techniques	needed	to	monitor	the	equipment.	
4.1.1.3 Analysis 
Based	on	the	methods	of	detection	selected	and	listed	in	the	FMSA,	there	are	10	CM	
techniques	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	 detect	 the	 possible	 failure	 modes.	 Some	 failure	
modes	 can	 be	 detected	with	more	 than	 one	monitoring	method;	when	 this	 is	 the	
case	the	MPN	should	be	used	to	select	the	technique	with	the	highest	ranking,	hence	
the	most	efficient	 to	detect	 the	 failure.	At	 least	one	monitoring	method	per	 failure	
mode	 should	 be	 selected	 to	 ensure	 all	 the	 failures	 are	 covered.	 Some	 of	 the	
monitoring	 techniques	 required	 are	 typically	 used	 in	 Cameron	 SPS’s,	 while	 other	
methods	will	have	 to	be	added	to	 the	system.	The	CM	techniques	with	 the	highest	
MPN	and	covering	all	the	failure	modes	found	in	the	analysis	are	shown	in	Table	4‐1.	
For	 some	 of	 the	 failure	modes	 two	 CM	 techniques	with	 the	 same	MPN	 are	 listed,	
these	are	flow	metering	of	control	and	process	fluids.	Since	both	measurements	are	
currently	available	in	most	SPS’s,	they	both	will	be	used	to	monitor	the	condition	of	
the	valves,	 increasing	in	this	way	the	reliability	of	the	monitoring	system	for	these	
failures.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	4‐2	‐	Opening	and	closing	of	a	hydraulic	gate	valve	(source:	Cameron)	
	
a)	Valve	open b) Valve	closed 
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Table	4‐1	‐	CM	techniques	required	to	detect	valve	failures	
Methods	of	detection	currently	
available	
Additional	methods	of	detection	
required	
Process	pressure	monitoring	 Periodic	 pressure	 testing	 of	 the	 barrier	
philosophy	
Process	fluid	flow	metering	 Fluorescence	leak	detection	system	
Control	fluid	flow	metering	 Partial	stroke	testing	
Control	fluid	pressure	monitoring	 Valve	signature	analysis	
	
The	monitoring	techniques	currently	used	in	typical	Cameron	SPS’s	have	been	used	
extensively	by	Cameron	and	therefore	will	not	be	described	here.	The	new	methods	
proposed	by	this	research	work	are	explained	below.	
Periodic pressure testing of the barrier philosophy 
This	method	is	used	to	detect	the	integrity	of	the	seals	in	the	main	blocking	valves	of	
the	 tree,	which	 are	 the	 Production	Master	 Valve	 (PMV),	 and	 the	 Production	Wing	
Valve	 (PWV).	 To	 do	 the	 test	 both	 valves	 should	 be	 closed,	 then	 test	 fluid	 is	
introduced	 at	 a	 pressure	 equal	 to	 or	 slightly	 higher	 (max	 10%	 higher)	 than	 the	
normal	 system	 operating	 pressure.	 The	 pressure	 is	 held	 and	 recorded	 for	 10	
minutes	in	case	of	oil	fields	or	for	60	minutes	in	case	of	gas	fields.	If	the	seals	are	in	
good	condition	the	pressure	should	remain	constant	during	the	whole	testing	time,	
otherwise	a	decay	in	the	pressure	will	be	observed	(see	example	in							Figure	4‐3).	
Support	vessels	are	normally	used	 to	conduct	 the	 test.	The	vessel	will	 connect	 the	
test	 line	to	the	tree	through	an	access	valve	located	between	the	PMV	and	PWV	as	
shown	in	Figure	4‐4.	When	positive	pressure	 is	provided	through	the	test	 line,	 the	
seals	on	the	PWV	are	tested.	This	is	because	the	pressure	is	acting	on	the	upstream	
side	 of	 the	 valve	 emulating	 normal	 operating	 conditions,	 but	 for	 the	 PMV	 this	
positive	 pressure	 is	 acting	 on	 the	 downstream	 side,	 thus	 not	 representing	 a	 real	
scenario.	To	test	the	seals	on	the	PMV	a	negative	test	should	be	conducted.	This	test	
is	similar	to	the	positive	pressure	test	previously	described,	with	the	difference	that	
the	system	is	depressurized	instead	of	pressurized,	and	leaks	are	detected	if	there	is	
		
						Figure	4‐3	–	Examples	of	pressure	test	plot	[41].	1:	Pressurization,	2:	Stabilization.	
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an	increase	in	the	pressure	recorded,	indicating	that	process	fluid	is	passing	through	
the	PWV	seals.	[41]	
	
NORSOK	standard	D‐010	[38]	recommends	to	carry	out	this	test	once	a	month	until	
three	 consecutive	 tests	 have	 been	 performed,	 then	 once	 every	 three	months	 until	
three	 consecutive	 tests	 have	 been	 carried	 out	 and	 after	 that	 only	 once	 every	 six	
months.	This	could	add	significant	operating	costs	to	operators	and	one	alternative	
is	 to	 do	 the	 test	 from	 the	 topside	 facility	 by	 using	 the	 chemical	 injection	 line,	
provided	that	this	line	connects	to	the	tree	between	the	PMV	and	PWV.	
Fluorescence leak detection system 
This	 system	 described	 in	 section	 2.4	 consists	 of	 use	 of	 fluorometers	 that	 detect	
different	of	wavelengths	of	light	absorbed	by	seawater	and	hydrocarbons.	In	case	of	
standalone	 trees	 one	 detector	 per	 tree	 is	 sufficient.	 When	 trees	 are	 grouped	 in	
templates,	several	sensors	may	be	needed	depending	on	the	size	of	template,	since	
the	 effective	 radius	 of	 detection	 is	 about	 5m.	 A	 new	 design	 of	 fluorometers	 [42]	
promises	a	range	of	detection	up	to	10m.	
An	example	of	sensor	arrangement	in	a	template	with	4	XTs	is	shown	in	Figure	4‐5.	
This	type	of	sensor	is	particularly	efficient	for	oil	detection,	but	not	for	gas.	For	the	
latter,	acoustic	leak	detectors	are	recommended.	
	
Figure	4‐4	‐	Positive	pressure	test	[41]	
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Partial stroke testing 
The	easiest	way	to	verify	if	a	valve	fails	to	close	on	demand	is	by	shutting	the	valve	
and	 then	 opening	 it	 again.	 This	 is	 done	 during	 the	 periodic	 pressure	 testing	
described	previously;	however,	these	tests	are	not	carried	out	frequently	enough	to	
provide	good	indication	of	the	valves	over	a	long	period	of	time.	On	the	other	hand,	
shutting	the	valve	frequently	for	testing	adds	some	disruption	to	the	system	such	as	
temporary	 loss	of	production	and	 stop/start	procedures	 that	 should	be	done	only	
when	completely	necessary.	A	solution	for	this	is	to	do	partial	stroke	testing,	which	
consists	in	closing	the	valve	only	20%	and	opening	it	again.	By	using	this	procedure	
one	can	detect	if	the	valve	is	stuck	or	if	there	any	issues	preventing	or	slowing	down	
the	valve	closure.	The	analysis	of	the	parameters	measured	by	partial	stroke	test	can	
be	done	by	 comparing	 the	 signature	of	 the	valve	as	new	with	 the	 signature	of	 the	
partial	stroke	performed.	This	method	of	valve	signature	analysis	is	explained	below.	
Valve signature analysis 
Valve	signature	or	valve	profile	refers	to	the	behavior	of	valve/actuator	parameters	
with	 respect	 to	 each	 other,	 under	 specific	 operational	 conditions.	 Due	 to	 the	
mechanical	nature	and	fabrication	tolerances	of	the	valves	components,	each	valve	
will	have	its	own	unique	signature.	This	behavior	profile	should	be	recorded	before	
the	tree	is	put	into	production	when	the	valve	is	still	in	new	condition,	for	example	
at	 the	 factory	 acceptance	 test.	 	 This	 original	 signature	will	 represent	 the	 baseline	
and	will	be	used	later	to	compare	the	performance	of	the	valve	after	many	hours	of	
operation.	
For	the	valves	analyzed	in	this	case	study	the	author	recommends	a	valve	signature	
of	 actuator	 pressure	vs.	opening	(or	closing)	time.	 Even	 though	 this	 analysis	 might	
seem	simple,	a	plot	of	pressure	vs.	actuating	 time	can	provide	a	 lot	of	useful	data.	
From	this	graph	one	can	see	the	different	stages	of	the	valve	opening	or	closing.	The	
Figure	4‐5‐	Fluorometers	installed	on	subsea	template	
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pressure	 is	measured	by	a	sensor	 installed	 in	the	 low	pressure	line	and	the	values	
are	collected	by	the	SCM.	
A	 pressure‐time	 plot	 has	 been	 created	 using	 real	 data	 from	 Cameron	 MCS,	 to	
exemplify	the	valve	profile	concept.	The	values	listed	in	appendix	C	have	been	used	
to	create	the	plot	shown	in	Figure	4‐6	by	using	spreadsheet/graphing	software.	The	
graph	 shows	 the	 operation	 of	 a	 valve	 in	 new	 condition	 (green	 curve)	 and	 a	 valve	
with	some	degradation	or	mechanical	defect	(red	curve).	The	green	curve	is	based	
on	real	values	acquired	by	 the	SCM,	while	 the	red	curve	 is	 just	a	simulation	of	 the	
behavior	of	a	defective	valve.	From	this	plot	one	can	notice	the	valve	coming	off	its	
seat,	 the	 breakaway	 point,	 the	 actuator	 spring	 compressing	 and	 the	 valve	 contact	
with	 the	 seat.	 The	 breakaway	 point	 is	 the	 moment	 in	 time	 when	 the	 actuator	
overcomes	 the	 opposing	 forces	 (spring	 resistance,	 friction,	 hydraulic	 pressure	 on	
return	side,	etc.)	and	starts	moving.	
Looking	at	the	graph	one	can	depict	that	it	takes	about	1.8	seconds	to	open	the	valve	
when	 it	 is	 in	 healthy	 state.	 Once	 the	 valve	 hits	 the	 seal,	 the	 pressure	 builds	 up	
rapidly	until	the	maximum	hydraulic	pressure	given	by	the	system	(ca.	19000	psi)	is	
reached.	 A	 hypothetical	 failure	 has	 been	 plotted	 (red	 curve)	 to	 see	 the	 how	 the	
profile	varies	from	a	healthy	condition.	In	the	red	curve,	one	can	see	slower	pressure	
increase	when	 the	valve	 is	being	opened;	 it	 takes	about	0.3	additional	 seconds	 for	
the	valve	to	be	fully	open,	which	is	an	indication	that	something	is	wrong	with	the	
system,	possibly	an	obstruction	in	the	hydraulic	line	or	a	leakage	in	the	piston	seal.	
Figure	4‐6	‐	Valve	profile	(opening)	
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Pressure‐time	behavior	 should	be	known	 for	 the	most	 common	 failures	and	 these	
patterns	 can	 be	 fed	 into	 the	 diagnosis	 algorithms	 to	 determine	 automatically	 the	
cause	of	failure.	
4.1.2 Data acquisition and processing 
4.1.2.1 Data acquisition 
The	 physical	 properties	measured	 by	 the	 sensors	 (e.g.	 pressure)	 are	 converted	 to	
electrical	signals	ranging	from	4‐20	mA,	where	4	mA	corresponds	to	the	lowest	limit	
of	 the	 range	 and	 20	 mA	 to	 the	 highest	 end.	 Then	 these	 electrical	 signals	 are	
converted	 to	 a	 discrete	 time	 digital	 value	 that	 represents	 the	 physical	 property	
measured.	 For	 instance	 in	 a	 pressure	 transmitter	 that	 has	 been	 calibrated	 to	
measure	from	0	bar	(4	mA)	to	10	bar	(20	mA),	a	signal	of	12	mA	(50%	of	the	range)	
will	be	represent	a	pressure	of	5	bar.	
The	 analog	 data	 is	 collected	 and	 digitized	 by	 the	 subsea	 electronic	module	 in	 the	
subsea	 control	 module	 and	 then	 transmitted	 to	 the	 master	 control	 station	 for	
further	processing.	
4.1.2.2 Data manipulation 
In	the	instance	of	the	parameters	measured	in	this	case	study	the	raw	data	received	
by	 the	 MCS	 is	 in	 the	 proper	 form	 for	 further	 analysis;	 as	 a	 result	 there	 is	 no	
manipulation	of	data	needed.	
4.1.3 Models for fault detection, diagnosis and prognosis 
4.1.3.1 Periodic pressure testing of the barrier philosophy 
For	the	periodic	pressure	test	of	the	PMV	and	PWV	no	complex	model	is	necessary.	
The	 evaluation	 criterion	 simply	 consists	 on	 evaluating	 the	 hold	 pressure	 and	
visually	detecting	if	the	pressure	varies.	This	process	could	be	automated,	but	since	
pressure	tests	usually	require	witnessing	of	the	procedure	to	create	quality	control	
records,	a	manual	verification	is	sufficient.	
4.1.3.2 Leak detection system 
Detection	of	 hydrocarbon	by	 fluorescence	or	 acoustic	 signals	 is	 done	by	detecting	
presence	or	not	of	hydrocarbons	within	the	sensor	range.	Thus,	the	use	of	predictive	
models	is	not	applicable	for	leak	detection.	
4.1.3.3 Partial stroke testing and valve signature analysis 
A	simple	pattern	recognition	model	 is	recommended	for	gate	valves	and	hydraulic	
actuators.	This	model	will	be	based	on	empirical	results	obtained	when	new	valves	
are	 tested	 after	 assembly	 in	 the	 XT.	 The	 result	 of	 these	 tests	 is	 the	 original	 valve	
signature,	which	will	 be	 used	 during	 operation	 to	 compare	 the	 values	 in	working	
conditions	 vs.	 the	 values	 of	 the	 original	 signature.	 It	 is	 worth	 to	 mention	 that	 in	
addition	 to	 internal	 forces	 of	 the	 actuator	 i.e.	 spring	 force,	 pressure	on	 the	 return	
side	 or	 piston	 side,	 piston	 seal	 friction	 and	 stem	 packing	 friction;	 the	 wellhead	
pressure	 also	 adds	 resistance	 to	 the	 opening/closing	 of	 the	 valve	 during	 normal	
operation;	however	these	forces	are	negligible	when	compared	with	the	high	force	
exerted	by	the	actuator	and	will	not	be	taken	in	consideration.	
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For	partial	stroke	testing	the	analysis	is	similar	to	the	one	previously	described,	with	
the	difference	that	the	valve	opens	only	for	a	short	period	of	time	with	the	purpose	
of	obtaining	approximately	20%	of	the	closing	span.	Since	the	valves	in	question	do	
not	 have	 position	 indicators,	 other	methods	 should	 be	 used	 to	 estimate	when	 the	
valve	is	20%	closed.	The	author	suggests	using	the	valve	signature	for	reference	of	
closing	time.	One	can	say	for	example	that	 if	a	new	valve	takes	0.2	seconds	for	the	
gate	 to	 come	 off	 the	 seat	 (breakaway)	 and	 then	 2	 seconds	 to	 close	 fully	 from	 the	
breakaway	point,	it	would	take	approximately	0.6	seconds	(breakaway	time	+	20%	
closing	time)	to	close	20%.	This	value	is	not	exact	since	the	closing	of	the	valve	is	not	
linear	due	 to	 the	spring	action,	but	 in	 this	case	 that	 is	not	so	relevant	because	 the	
accuracy	of	the	closing	range	is	not	critical	for	the	test.	The	objective	of	this	partial	
stroke	test	is	to	plot	the	pressure	decay	of	the	valve	closing	up	to	20%	and	compare	
it	 to	 the	 original	 signature,	 to	 see	 if	 there	 are	 any	major	 discrepancies	 that	 could	
indicate	some	 issues	with	 the	valve	or	actuator	such	as	gate	obstruction	or	spring	
failure.	
4.1.4 Discussion 
At	 first	glance	a	subsea	gate	valve	with	hydraulic	actuator	might	seem	a	relatively	
simple	 device,	 especially	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 electronics	 and	 the	 limited	 range	 of	
motion.	 But	 when	 the	 analysis	 of	 failure	 modes	 was	 carried	 out,	 the	 results	
contradicted	 the	 initial	 estimation.	 The	 valve	 and	 actuator	 analyzed	 in	 this	 case	
study	 can	 have	 many	 failures	 of	 different	 nature.	 Consequently,	 the	 monitoring	
techniques	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 proper	 predictive	 maintenance	 can	 be	 many	 and	
represent	a	considerable	capital	investment.	
The	FMSA	is	probably	the	most	 important	step	in	establishing	a	CM	program.	This	
document	 provides	 important	 and	 relevant	 information	 to	 determine	 the	 type	 of	
sensors	 to	be	used,	crucial	data	 for	establishing	a	 “best	 in	class”	CM	program.	 It	 is	
very	important	to	get	input	from	experts	with	vast	experience	in	fault	management	
of	subsea	systems,	as	well	as	use	reliable	historical	data.	
The	key	for	effective	implementation	(both	economically	and	technically)	of	CM	lies	
in	 using	 the	 sensors	 and	 equipment	 already	 available	 in	 existing	 SPS’s	 in	 a	 smart	
way.	This	has	been	demonstrated	with	the	valve	signature	analysis	proposed	earlier,	
where	 simple	 signals	 currently	 measured	 in	 any	 SPS	 are	 used	 to	 determine	 the	
health	of	the	valves/actuators.	There	are	many	other	ways	to	do	signature	analysis.	
For	 example,	 by	 using	 position	 detectors	 coupled	 with	 electronic	 valve	 position	
analyzers,	but	the	question	the	designers	of	the	CM	system	have	to	ask	themselves	
are:	
 Do	we	really	need	a	new	sophisticated	system?	
 Will	this	new	system	provide	much	more	useful	information	than	others?	
 Can	 we	 determine	 the	 health	 of	 the	 equipment	 by	 other	 –and	 simpler‐	
means?	
Regardless	of	the	simplicity	of	the	valve	profile	analysis,	the	efficacy	of	this	method	
relies	on	 the	quality	of	 the	original	signature;	 if	 the	 latter	cannot	be	 trusted	 it	will	
not	be	able	to	provide	an	accurate	baseline	to	be	compared	against	the	valve	profile	
during	 operation.	 This	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 a	 good	 factory	
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acceptance	test	of	the	trees	when	they	are	fabricated,	so	reliable	valve	signatures	are	
generated	for	further	use.	
Another	interesting	finding	is	that	in	many	cases	there	is	no	one	size	fits	all	solution	
available.	That	is	the	case	of	leak	detectors.	Even	though	subsea	leak	detection	is	a	
relatively	small	technology	niche,	there	are	a	handful	of	different	technologies	that	
can	be	used	 in	different	scenarios	depending	on	the	type	of	 fluid	being	monitored,	
leak	rate	detection	sensitivity,	and	effective	area	of	sensor	coverage.	
It	 is	 also	 significant	 to	 notice	 the	 importance	 of	 keeping	 to	 a	 minimum	 the	
equipment	shutdowns	for	testing	the	integrity	of	the	systems.	One	way	to	deal	with	
this	 is	 by	 executing	 the	 partial	 stroke	 testing	 explained	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	
which	 allows	 for	 testing	 the	 opening	 and	 closing	 function	 of	 the	 valves	 without	
stopping	production.	
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4.2 Case study 2: Power supply unit 
4.2.1 Measurement 
4.2.1.1 Identification of equipment and function 
The	 Cameron	 Power	 Supply	 Unit	 (PSU)	 shown	 in	 Figure	 4‐7,	 is	 a	 device	 located	
inside	 the	 Subsea	 Electronic	 Module	 in	 the	 SCM	 and	 which	 main	 function	 is	 to	
convert	 the	 high	 input	 voltage	 to	 a	 low	 output	 voltage	 to	 supply	 the	 SEM/SCM	
internal	electronics	and	all	connected	SCM	external	instruments	with	electric	power.	
The	PSU	is	composed	of	one	input	module	(a)	and	one	output	module	(b).	A	detail	
schematic	of	the	PSU	cannot	be	presented	here	due	to	proprietary	information	from	
Cameron	 and	 PSU	 supplier.	 However,	 a	 simple	 flow	 diagram	 (see	 Figure	 4‐8)	 has	
been	created	to	describe	how	the	unit	works.	
First,	the	input	module	receives	Alternating	Current	(AC)	power;	next	this	power	is	
filtered	and	rectified	to	convert	it	in	Direct	Current	(DC).	Then	the	current	is	limited	
to	 350	 VDC	 by	 a	 chopper,	 after	 that	 the	 power	 passes	 through	 a	 power	 factor	
correction	 circuit	 and	 is	 finally	 sent	 to	 the	 output	 module	 where	 4	 step‐down	
converters	transform	the	350	VDC	to	24	VDC	output	voltage	which	is	the	standard	
supply	voltage	 for	external	 instrumentation	according	to	SIIS.	The	 input	voltage	to	
the	PS	 can	be	 in	DC	or	AC.	 In	 the	case	of	 input	power	 in	DC,	 the	 current	does	not	
need	 to	 be	 converted	 and	 the	 rectifier	 acts	 only	 as	 a	 conductor.	 Cameron	 PS	 can	
receive	an	input	voltage	ranging	from	300	to	850	VAC	or	400	to	1200	VDC.		
				 								a)	Input	module	 	 	 	 									b)	Output	module	
Figure	4‐7	‐	Cameron	Power	Supply	Unit	(source:	Cameron)	
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The	power	supply	unit	depicted	here	is	the	latest	model	developed	by	Cameron	and	
its	 supplier;	 it	has	 the	capability	 to	be	monitored	extensively	and	 it	 is	expected	 to	
have	better	reliability	than	previous	models.	
Each	 SCM	 has	 two	 SEMs	 for	 redundancy	 and	 there	 is	 one	 PSU	 in	 each	 SEM;	 this	
means	 that	 in	case	of	a	PSU	 failure	 in	one	of	 the	SEMs,	 the	other	unit	 in	 the	other	
SEM	should	take	over	as	soon	as	the	failure	is	detected	to	maintain	functionality	of	
the	system.	
4.2.1.2 FMSA 
Appendix	 E	 contains	 the	 failure	 modes,	 symptoms	 and	 appropriate	 monitoring	
techniques	for	the	PSU.	Since	this	PSU	is	a	new	model,	there	was	no	reliability	data	
from	field	experience	available.	Hence,	the	FMSA	study	was	based	mostly	on	experts’	
advice.	 Another	 way	 to	 find	 the	 possible	 failure	 modes	 is	 by	 performing	 an	
accelerated	test,	where	the	unit	is	subjected	to	high	stresses	over	a	relatively	short	
period	of	time	to	simulate	the	stresses	expected	over	the	lifetime	of	the	equipment.	
4.2.1.3 Analysis 
The	PSU	described	earlier	has	the	capability	for	monitoring	multiple	variables,	these	
are:	
 Input	voltage	and	current	
 Output	voltages	and	currents	
 Various	temperatures	
 Circuit	voltages	
 Microcontroller	status	
		
Figure	4‐8	‐	Power	supply	unit	flowchart	
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These	parameters	will	allow	detection,	diagnosis	and	prognosis	of	the	failure	modes	
listed	 in	 the	 FMSA.	 Some	 of	 these	 variables	 will	 require	 the	 use	 of	 algorithms	 to	
interpret	the	symptoms;	these	are	explained	in	detail	in	section	4.2.3.	
4.2.2 Data acquisition and processing 
4.2.2.1 Data acquisition 
Due	to	the	electronic	nature	of	the	PSU,	all	the	data	collected	is	already	digitized	and	
it	only	needs	 to	be	 time/quality	stamped	 in	 the	SCM	and	 then	sent	 to	 the	MCS	 for	
further	processing.	
4.2.2.2 Data manipulation 
When	the	input	power	is	in	AC,	the	effective	
current	 and	 voltage	 have	 to	 be	 calculated	
using	 the	Root	Mean	Square	 (RMS)	method.	
This	 conversion	 is	 necessary	 due	 to	 the	
sinusoidal	 form	of	 the	AC.	As	 seen	 in	Figure	
4‐9	 the	 AC	 voltage	 (and	 current)	 fluctuates	
between	a	positive	peak	and	a	negative	peak.	
Since	most	the	time	the	voltage	(or	current)	
is	 somewhere	 in	 between	 the	 extremes,	 the	
peaks	 are	 not	 good	 representative	 values.	
That	 is	 why	 the	 voltage	 and	 current	 are	
expressed	 in	 RMS	 terms	 by	 applying	 the	
following	formula:	
	
	 ோܸெௌ ൌ 0.707	 ൈ	 ௣ܸ௘௔௞	 (4)	
	
	
Where:	
VRMS	is	the	root	mean	square	voltage	
Vpeak	is	the	peak	voltage	
	
Equation	 (3)	 is	 also	 applicable	 for	 current.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 DC	 voltage	 it	 is	 not	
necessary	to	calculate	RMS	because	the	signal	steady.	
4.2.3 Models for fault detection, diagnosis and prognosis 
Since	 the	 failure	data	 is	scarce	because	 the	PSU	has	not	been	yet	 in	operation	and	
also	due	to	the	nature	of	the	failures,	it	is	recommended	to	use	a	Physics	of	Failure	
approach.	 This	 method	 consists	 of	 estimating	 the	 state	 of	 the	 equipment	 and	
predicting	its	RUL	by	comparing	current	environmental	and	operational	loads	with	
a	predictive	model	of	degradation.	Pecht	(41)	explains	how	this	method	is	based	on	
the	 assumption	 that	 the	 level	 of	 exposure	 (time	 and	 magnitude)	 of	 a	 system	 to	
external	loads	determines	its	degree	of	degradation.	A	PoF	method	is	developed	in	
the	following	manner	[43]:	
	
Figure	4‐9	‐	AC	peak	voltage	and	RMS	
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 Identify	possible	failure	modes	and	the	environmental	and	operational	loads	
that	could	cause	these	failures	(FMSA).	
 Determine	 the	 dominant	 failure	 mechanism,	 by	 using	 accelerated	 test	 or	
expert’s	advice.	
 Develop	a	behavioral	model	of	the	dominant	failure	mechanism.	
 Create	an	algorithm	for	failure	detection	and	calculation	of	RUL,	based	on	the	
data	 obtained	 in	 accelerated	 tests	 and	 statistical	 distributions	 applicable	 to	
the	failure	mechanism.		
Environmental	loads	are	those	conditions	external	to	the	function	of	the	equipment	
that	can	affect	 its	performance	in	one	way	or	another.	Environmental	 loads	can	be	
thermal,	 mechanical,	 chemical	 or	 physical.	 Operational	 loads	 are	 those	 factors	
inherent	to	the	function	of	the	equipment	that	can	have	an	effect	on	its	performance,	
such	as	voltage,	current	or	resistance.	
In	the	case	of	the	PSU,	the	most	important	factors	to	develop	the	model	and	monitor	
the	 health	 of	 the	 system	 are	 the	 temperature	 of	 the	 PSU,	 the	 input	 and	 output	
voltages,	and	input	and	output	currents.	
4.2.3.1 PSU failure 
To	predict	general	failure	of	the	PSU	(item	1.1	in	FMSA)	caused	by	thermal	cycling,	it	
is	 recommended	 to	 use	 the	 Coffin	 Manson’s	 model	 [44,	 45],	 which	 requires	 an	
accelerated	test	to	validate	it.	The	model	is	defined	by	the	following	formula:	
	
	 ௙ܰ௨ ൌ ௙ܰ௔ ൈ ቀ∆்ಲ∆ ೠ்ቁ
ଶ	 (5)	
	
Where:	
Nfu	is	the	number	cycles	to	failure	at	operating	temperature	change	
Nfa	is	the	number	cycles	to	failure	at	accelerated	temperature	change	
ΔTa	is	the	thermal	cycle	temperature	change	in	accelerated	environment	(˚K)	
ΔTu	is	the	thermal	cycle	temperature	change	in	operating	environment	(˚K)	
4.2.3.2 ESR estimation 
According	to	Imam	et	al.	[46],	the	most	common	cause	of	power	supplies	breakdown	
is	 attributed	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 electrolytic	 capacitors.	 These	 components	 are	
responsible	 for	 storing	 and	 filtering	 the	 electrical	 energy	 coming	 out	 of	 the	
converters.	
The	 main	 symptoms	 of	 a	 degraded	 electrolytic	 capacitor	 are	 an	 increase	 in	 the	
Equivalent	 Series	 Resistance	 (ESR)	 and	 a	 decrease	 of	 the	 capacitance.	 The	 ESR	
cannot	 be	 measured	 directly,	 but	 it	 can	 be	 estimated	 by	 finding	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 ESR	 and	 other	 variables	 available	 for	 diagnosis.	 There	 have	 several	
models	developed	to	estimate	this	relationship	based	on	PoF;	two	of	these	methods	
are	explained	below.	
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It	has	been	demonstrated	that	an	increase	in	the	ESR	generates	elevates	the	ripple	
voltage	of	the	converter.	By	finding	the	relation	between	ESR	and	ripple	voltage	the	
degradation	 state	 of	 the	 capacitor	 can	 be	 estimated.	 This	 is	 called	 the	 failure	
prediction	 method	 and	 can	 be	 summarized	 by	 the	 following	 formula	 derived	 by	
Chen	et	al.	[47]:	
	
	 ESR ൌ ௏ೀ,ೌ೎ூಽ,ೌ೎ 			 (6)	
	Where:	
VO,ac	is	the	output	AC	ripple	voltage	
IL,ac	is	the	inductor	current	AC	component	
	
Another	approach	that	can	be	used	to	estimate	the	ESR,	is	the	life	prediction	method,	
which	consists	of	calculating	the	temperature	increase	caused	by	the	ripple	current	
and	relate	this	value	with	the	ESR.	This	relationship	has	been	defined	by	Kulkarni	et	
al.	[48]	using	this	equation:	
	
	 ଵாௌோ೟ ൌ 	
ଵ
ாௌோబ ሺ1 െ ݇. ݐ. ݁
ቀషరళబబ೅శమళయቁሻ	 (7)	
	
Where:	
ESRt	is	the	equivalent	series	resistance	(mΩ)	at	time	t	
ESR0	is	the	equivalent	series	resistance	(mΩ)	at	time	t=0	
k	is	capacitor	constant,	determined	empirically	and	dependent	on	the	capacitor	size	
and	geometry	
t	is	the	time	in	operation	(hr)	
T	is	operating	temperature	of	the	capacitor	(°C)	
	
According	 to	Kulkarni	 et	 al.	 [48]	 an	 electrolytic	 capacitor	will	 reach	 the	 end	of	 its	
useful	life	when	the	ESR	value	is	2.8	higher	than	its	initial	value.	
4.2.4 Discussion 
Diagnosing	and	predicting	failures	of	parts	with	no	records	of	operation,	such	as	the	
new	PSU	described	in	this	case	study,	requires	a	different	approach	than	for	devices	
with	 long	 history	 of	 operation	 and	 maintenance.	 The	 author	 proposes	 using	
accelerated	 life	 tests	 coupled	 with	 PoF	 models	 for	 newly	 designed	 equipment	 or	
parts.	
Even	 though	 the	 PSU	 analyzed	 is	 a	 complete	 new	 design,	 it	 still	 has	 several	
characteristics	 in	 common	with	 its	 predecessor.	 This	 similarity	 of	 parts	 is	 normal	
not	only	for	the	PSU,	but	also	for	most	of	the	novel	equipment.	One	key	to	determine	
possible	 failure	 modes	 is	 to	 find	 those	 commonalities	 and	 check	 if	 there	 are	 old	
failure	modes	that	could	be	present	in	the	new	design.	For	this,	it	is	very	important	
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to	 involve	 engineers	 and	 technicians	 with	 vast	 experience	 in	 maintenance	 of	 the	
legacy	 system.	Moreover,	 if	 the	new	part	 is	 designed	 and/or	 fabricated	by	 a	 third	
party,	the	supplier	should	also	be	consulted	because	it	might	have	some	failure	data	
of	similar	parts	used	in	other	applications.	
Another	 important	aspect	 if	 failure	prediction	of	newly	designed	equipment	 is	 the	
corroboration	 and	 refinement	 of	 the	 models	 created	 for	 fault	 diagnosis	 and	
prognosis.	When	parts	are	replaced	due	 to	 failure,	 the	actual	condition	of	 the	part	
should	 be	 compared	 with	 the	 degradation	 estimated	 by	 the	 model	 to	 see	 if	 the	
predictions	are	accurate.	 In	 the	case	of	noticeable	discrepancies,	 the	model	should	
be	refined	to	provide	better	diagnosis/prognosis	in	the	future.	
4.3 Advisory generation system proposed for Cameron SPS 
One	of	the	most	important	features	of	a	CM	system	is	the	ability	to	provide	decision	
support	 for	 maintenance	 planning	 and	 equipment	 operation.	 The	 goal	 of	 the	
advisory	generation	system	is	to	tell	the	operator	what	to	do	in	case	of	presence	of	a	
fault	or	failure,	without	the	need	for	expert	input	and	with	high	level	of	confidence.	
Recommended	 actions	 provided	 by	 the	 system	 are	 based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	
prognosis	and	could	be	one	or	more	of	the	following:	
 No	action	required	
 Change	operational	 parameters	 to	 reduce	 the	 strain	on	 the	 affected	part	 to	
extend	its	lifetime,	at	least	until	the	next	maintenance	campaign.	
 Reconfigure	the	system	to	bring	it	back	to	normal	operation,	for	example	by	
using	parallel	standby	equipment.	
 Perform	further	analysis,	for	instance	visual	inspection	by	ROV.	
 Maintenance	intervention	required	within	a	certain	timeframe	specified.	
 Immediate	maintenance	intervention.	
 Stop	 the	 equipment	 immediately	 to	 prevent	 irreversible	 damage	 or	
catastrophic	failure.	
The	 information	 conveyed	 by	 the	 system	 should	 be	 as	 specific	 as	 possible,	 for	
example:	
	
Under	 current	 operating	 conditions	 of	 production,	 the	 choke	
valve	tag	#	PCV‐12	has	a	95%	probability	of	achieving	a	RUL	
of	 400	 hrs;	 or	 as	 a	mitigating	measure	 if	 flow	 is	 reduced	 by	
50%,	the	RUL	can	be	extended	to	650	hrs	with	a	probability	of	
achievement	of	90%	
	
The	information	can	be	presented	as	simple	text	or	better	yet	in	graphical	form,	such	
as	the	dashboard	exemplified	in	appendix	D.	
Since	 Cameron	 access	 to	 information	 from	 the	 field	 operator	 is	 limited	 to	 the	
equipment	 and	 operating	 conditions,	 the	 actions/solutions	 proposed	 by	 the	
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advisory	system	can	provide	recommended	time	for	intervention	based	only	on	the	
RUL	estimated	and	not	on	external	factors,	such	as	availability	of	support	vessel/rig,	
maintenance	 personnel,	 spare	 parts;	 opportunity	 cost;	 maintenance	 campaign	
scheduled	 for	 the	 same	 field;	 etc.	Consequently	 field	operators	 should	 consider	all	
other	factors	that	will	affect	positively	or	negatively	their	production	strategy	if	the	
recommended	action	is	taken	as	it	is.	
In	 order	 to	 integrate	decision	 support	 systems	with	 the	 end	user	 operator’s	 asset	
management	system,	there	has	to	exist	some	kind	of	standardization	in	the	way	the	
data	is	saved,	formatted	and	transmitted.	A	non‐profit	organization	has	been	created	
to	 deal	 with	 this	 standardization	 issue:	 the	 Machinery	 Information	 Management	
Open	System	Alliance	(MIMOSA).	
MIMOSA	has	developed	a	vendor‐neutral	open	information	exchange	standard	that	
provides	 open	 system	 architecture	 for	 condition	 monitoring,	 as	 well	 as	 rules	 for	
integration	 of	 the	 monitoring	 system	 with	 enterprise	 applications	 for	 asset	
management	[49].	
The	 actions	 suggested	 by	 the	 advisory	 system	 are	 not	 necessarily	 absolute.	 If	 the	
user	needs	to	make	a	change	in	the	maintenance	strategy	proposed	by	the	system,	it	
could	probably	be	done,	but	they	should	contact	Cameron	for	further	discussion	and	
risk	evaluation	of	alternative	solutions.	
4.4 Display system for Cameron SPS 
The	purpose	of	the	CM	display	system	is	to	provide	audiovisual	 information	about	
the	 condition	 of	 the	 subsea	 production	 system,	 including	 presence	 of	 faults,	
alerts/alarms	 related	 to	 equipment	 faults,	 state	 of	 the	 equipment,	 estimated	RUL,	
possible	 future	 failures,	 and	 provide	 recommendation	 for	 equipment	 intervention	
when	needed.	
Taking	human	 factors	 into	 consideration,	 the	 system	should	be	designed	as	ruled‐
based,	 i.e.	operators	are	not	required	to	have	 interaction	with	the	system	to	detect	
any	anomalies,	unless	and	alert,	alarm	or	trip	goes	off.	Once	a	fault	is	detected,	the	
operator	should	follow	a	set	of	predetermined	rules	to	get	more	information	about	
the	 problem	 and	 how	 to	 proceed.	 This	 process	 can	 be	 illustrated	 with	 a	 simple	
example:	
	
A	SPS	is	currently	working	normally	without	need	for	operator’s	surveying	of	the	
system,	other	than	process	monitoring.	An	alert	is	then	generated:	
Alert!	∆P	across	choke	valve	PCV‐12	is	X	bars	under	the	normal	operational	
limit	
At	 that	point	 the	 first	 rule	 is	activated;	 the	operator	 should	 check	 if	 there	have	
been	any	changes	in	the	operation	condition	that	may	have	triggered	the	alert	or	
if	this	could	be	a	real	sign	of	choke	degradation.		
	
There	are	many	ways	to	present	the	information.	The	author	recommends	the	use	of	
dashboards	 to	 convey	 the	 information	 to	 the	 operator	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 easy	 to	
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understand	 and	 with	 minimum	 room	 for	 misinterpretation	 of	 information* .	
Dashboards	 are	 commonly	used	 to	monitor	production	or	business	processes	 and	
have	 been	 adopted	 by	many	 industries.	 Dashboards	 should	 have	 a	 simple	 design;	
these	are	some	basic	rules	for	process	representation	(88):	
 Bright	saturated	colors	should	be	used	only	to	indicate	abnormal	conditions.	
 Avoid	3D	or	complex	representation	of	equipment.	
 Data	is	not	information,	unless	that	is	presented	in	the	proper	form.	
 Visual	indicators	are	most	effective	than	just	values.	
 Trends	in	equipment	operational	parameters	should	be	included.	
 Avoid	 process	 representation	 by	 Piping	 and	 Instrumentation	 Diagrams	
(P&ID).	
 Displays	should	be	organized	by	hierarchy	for	proper	navigation.	
The	 last	 point	 above	 denotes	 that	 the	 system	 should	 contain	 one	 main	 display	
showing	the	overall	health	information	of	the	whole	system	and	a	set	of	sub‐displays	
with	 more	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 subsystems	 and	 even	 down	 to	 the	
component	 level.	When	a	 fault	 is	detected,	 the	user	 should	be	able	 to	 look	deeper	
into	the	more	specific	displays	to	find	information	about	the	root	cause.	
Due	 to	 the	 remote	 nature	 of	 a	 SPS	 system,	 the	 graphical	 representation	 of	 the	
equipment	 is	 not	 so	 relevant.	What	 is	more	 important	 is	 that	 the	 data	 presented	
provides	 the	 user	 with	 useful	 information	 about	 the	 condition	 and	 possible	
faults/failures	 of	 the	 SPS	 and	 its	 different	 elements;	 hence	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	
display	fancy	pictures	of	the	equipment	or	detailed	field	layouts.	The	user	should	be	
able	to	get	the	following	information	at	a	glance:	
 Is	there	anything	wrong	with	the	condition	of	the	equipment?	If	so,	
 What	is	wrong?	
 What	is	the	current	condition	of	the	equipment?	
 How	 long	 can	 the	 equipment	 continue	 working	 without	 breaking	 down	 or	
having	a	catastrophic	failure?	
 Will	this	problem	cause	other	faults?	
 What	can	be	done	to	mitigate	and/or	fix	the	problem?	
4.5 Integrated solutions for fault detection, diagnosis and prognosis 
There	 exist	 several	 interesting	 software	 packages	 in	 today’s	market	 for	 condition	
monitoring.	These	programs	provide	a	common	platform	for	the	different	conditions	
monitored	in	an	industrial	system,	analyzing	the	data	and	presenting	it	to	the	user	in	
a	friendly	format.	The	extent	of	the	information	provided	varies	among	the	different	
packages,	 some	 offer	 fault	 detection	 and	 diagnosis	 while	 others	 include	 also	
																																																								
*	Please	note:	The	design	of	system	displays	or	Human	Machine	Interface	(HMI)	is	a	field	of	study	on	
its	own	and	it	is	not	covered	here	in	detail.	The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	by	no	means	to	provide	detailed	
guidelines	for	HMI	design.	
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estimation	of	remaining	useful	 life;	some	are	experienced	 in	subsea	systems	while	
others	are	not.	
The	author	has	 studied	several	of	 the	software	packages	available	and	has	chosen	
the	three	more	suitable	for	SPS’s	to	evaluate	them	and	propose	the	best	alternative	
for	Cameron	to	use	in	the	CM	of	subsea	equipment.	
The	packages	studied	and	the	companies	that	make	them	have	been	named	A,	B	and	
C	for	simplicity	and	to	avoid	commercial	issues.	Since	the	information	available	over	
the	 Internet	 about	 these	 software	 is	 scarce	 and	 of	 marketing	 nature,	 all	 three	
suppliers	 have	 been	 contacted	 directly	 to	 obtain	 as	much	 information	 as	 possible	
about	their	products.	
Company	 A/Software	 A	 have	 been	 in	 the	 business	 of	 equipment	 surveillance	 for	
many	 years	 and	 has	 proven	 experience	 in	 monitoring	 aerospace	 vehicles,	 land	
transportation,	 sea	 transportation,	 power	 generation,	 healthcare.	 This	 software	
offers	 fault	 detection,	 diagnostics	 and	 trending;	 it	 seems	 very	 complete,	 but	 the	
company	weakness	is	their	lack	of	experience	and	knowledge	in	subsea	systems	and	
oil/gas	production.	Company	A	has	expressed	their	interest	in	developing	a	software	
solution	 for	 Cameron	 based	 on	 their	 broad	 experience,	 provided	 that	 Cameron	
supports	 them	with	 the	 knowledge	 necessary,	 such	 as	 failure	modes,	 operational	
procedures,	maintenance	history,	equipment	drawings	and	manuals,	etc.	
Company	B	started	by	developing	CBM	software	for	the	maritime	industry	and	they	
have	extended	and	adapted	their	product	range	to	oil/gas	production,	specifically	to	
subsea	systems.	The	system	is	based	on	the	technical	condition	 index	described	 in	
section	2.3.1.	
Company	C	offers	a	software	platform	for	remote	monitoring	and	diagnosis	that	has	
been	 proven	 in	 oil	 and	 gas	 production,	 including	 a	 subsea	 installation	 in	 the	
Norwegian	Sea.	The	 current	product	does	not	have	 the	 capability	 for	prognosis	of	
future	 degradation	 or	 failure;	 however,	 company	 C	 has	 extensive	 experience	 in	
advanced	algorithms	including	NN	and	fuzzy	logics,	and	they	are	willing	to	develop	a	
prognosis	system	specifically	for	Cameron.	
The	main	features	of	each	company/software	are	presented	in	Table	4‐2.	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 three	 software	 solutions	 presented	 hereinbefore	 are	 quite	
competitive.	 Based	 on	 this	 preliminary	 information,	 the	 author	 believes	 that	
company	“A”	provides	the	best	solution;	they	seem	to	have	the	most	mature	system	
and	 algorithms.	 Even	 though	 company	 “A”	 does	 not	 have	 experience	with	 subsea	
systems,	 they	have	 the	potential	 to	develop	a	customized	solution	 for	Cameron,	as	
long	as	they	are	given	support	and	necessary	data.	This	recommendation	is	based	on	
the	 information	 about	 the	 companies	 available	 over	 the	 Internet	 and	 various	
communications	held	with	each	supplier.	
The	author	further	recommends	having	formal	technical	and	commercial	evaluation	
of	 the	three	competitors.	One	way	to	make	the	assessment	as	 fair	as	possible	 is	 to	
present	all	three	companies	with	a	base	case	study,	including	a	sample	data	set	for	
them	to	develop	a	solution	and	provide	a	 technical	and	commercial	proposal.	This	
way	it	would	be	easier	to	compare	the	different	options	presented.	
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Table	4‐2	‐	Software	comparison	
Feature	 Software	A	 Software	B	 Software	C	
Years	in	business 19	 17	 N/A*	
Experience	in	oil	
and	gas	
No	 Yes	 Yes	
Experience	in	
subsea	
No	 Yes	 Yes	
Fault	detection	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Diagnosis	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Prognosis	 Yes	 No	 No	
Mobile	alert	
capability	
Yes	 No	 Yes	
Web	access	
capability	
Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Other	features	 Software	hosting,	i.e.	the	
supplier	can	run/maintain	
the	software,	analyze	the	
data	and	provide	decision	
support.	
Traffic	light	alert	
system.	
System	based	on	
TCI.	
Based	on	expert	
diagnostic	
knowledge	
	
	 	
																																																								
*	N/A:	no	public	information	was	available	by	the	time	this	report	was	written	
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5 Recommendations for further work 
Due	to	the	time	and	resource	constraints	inherent	of	this	type	of	research,	it	was	not	
possible	to	do	a	full	analysis	of	all	the	monitoring	techniques	needed	in	a	SPS.	Since	
the	architecture	of	subsea	systems	differ	from	field	to	field,	the	author	recommends	
Cameron	to	develop	a	CM	system	based	on	a	SPS	currently	in	operation,	that	reflects	
the	 aspects	 most	 commonly	 found	 in	 today’s	 subsea	 fields.	 An	 example	 will	 be	 a	
system	with	multiplex	electro‐hydraulic	control	system;	combination	of	standalone	
trees,	manifold	clusters	and	templates;	gas/water	injection;	and	retrievable	chokes.	
The	next	step	to	be	carried	out	by	Cameron	is	to	apply	this	methodology	for	the	SPS	
chosen	 to	 define	 fault	 management	 models,	 monitoring	 techniques/sensors	
required	and	an	advisory	generation	system	for	the	whole	system.	This	generic	CM	
program	based	on	a	typical	subsea	field	could	then	be	used	as	a	model	for	other	field	
architectures.	
The	 guidelines	 presented	 in	 this	 research	 were	 developed	 specifically	 for	
conventional	SPS’s;	however,	they	could	be	easily	adapted	to	more	complex	systems	
such	 as	 subsea	 processing	 or	 all‐electrical	 control	 systems.	 In	 the	 field	 of	 subsea	
rotating	equipment	(pumps	and	compressors)	 there	has	been	some	research	done	
with	respect	to	condition	monitoring	that	could	be	used	as	a	starting	point.	
The	way	valve	 signatures	are	 recorded	 in	Cameron	projects	 is	not	very	 clear.	 It	 is	
advisable	for	Cameron	subsea	controls	division	to	gather	the	teams	responsible	for	
valve	fabrication,	test	and	installation	on	the	trees/manifolds,	to	develop	a	common	
procedure	 for	 recording	 the	 valve	 signature	 during	 factory	 acceptance	 test	 of	 the	
equipment.	 Cameron	 should	 take	 advantage	 of	 its	 vast	 experience	 in	 design	 and	
fabrication	 of	 hydraulic	 operated	 gate	 valves,	 and	 use	 this	 knowledge	 to	 develop	
examples	of	how	typical	failure	modes	are	reflected	in	the	valve	profile.	
This	 thesis	 did	 not	 cover	 communication	 and	data	 transmission	between	 the	MCS	
and	Cameron	onshore	support	center.	Further	research	should	determine	 the	best	
options	for	interaction	between	the	offshore	facility	and	onshore	operation	centers.	
At	a	minimum,	the	following	aspects	should	be	defined	for	both	the	operator’s	and	
Cameron’s	onshore	operation	centers:	
 Frequency	of	data	transmission.	
 Reduction	(e.g.	averaging)	and	compression	of	data.	
 Type	of	access	by	Cameron	and	third	parties	to	the	CM	system	and	other.	
 Access	 to	 the	 operator’s	 asset	management	 system	by	 Cameron	 to	 support	
advisory	generation	system	(optional).	
The	scope	of	this	thesis	was	centered	on	the	measurement	part	of	the	CM	process;	
therefore,	 diagnosis	 and	 prognosis	 should	 be	 studied	 more	 in	 depth.	 For	 this,	
Cameron	could	partner	up	with	a	CM	software	provider	to	generate	comprehensive	
models	for	fault	diagnosis	and	prognosis	without	compromising	Cameron’s	internal	
human	resources.	The	alternatives	 for	 this	partnership	should	be	studied	carefully	
to	 select	 the	most	 suitable	option,	 taking	 into	 consideration	both	 the	needs	of	 the	
customer	and	Cameron.	
Lastly,	 condition	monitoring	programs	could	be	extended	 to	downhole	equipment,	
umbilicals,	 pipelines,	 flowlines	 and	 risers,	 and	 flow	 assurance	 and	 production	
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optimization	could	be	included	as	part	of	the	advisory	generation	system,	to	offer	a	
full	equipment/process	monitoring	solution	to	the	end	users.	
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6 Conclusive remarks 
This	thesis	aimed	to	fulfill	a	gap	in	the	information	available	on	how	to	a	carry	out	
surveillance	of	subsea	equipment	in	a	systematic	way.	CM	methodologies	described	
in	 industry	standards	such	as	 ISO	and	 IEC	are	 tailored	 for	rotating	equipment	and	
some	 static	 machines	 for	 surface	 facilities,	 and	 therefore	 not	 so	 useful	 for	 static	
subsea	equipment.	The	main	difference	between	surface	and	subsea	equipment	lies	
on	 their	 maintainability.	 Components	 that	 are	 considered	 noncritical	 in	 surface	
applications	(e.g.	gate	valves)	become	critical	equipment	when	they	are	installed	in	
equipment	 operating	 on	 the	 seabed.	 The	 development	 of	 subsea	 specific	 CM	
methodologies	 like	 the	 one	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 a	 great	 tool	 for	 subsea	
equipment	 suppliers	 or	 operators	 who	 want	 to	 implement	 a	 CM	 program	
systematically. 
Despite	 the	many	advances	 in	sensor	 technology	achieved	 in	 the	 last	 two	decades,	
the	 subsea	 business	 still	 lags	 behind	 other	 industries	 with	 regards	 to	 condition	
monitoring.	This	is	caused	mainly	by:	1)	The	lack	of	advanced	sensors	designed	and	
qualified	 for	 subsea	 applications	 and,	 2)	 The	 passive	 nature	 of	 many	 of	 the	
components	 found	 in	 conventional	 SPS’s.	 But,	 with	 the	 increasing	 demand	 for	
efficiency	 driven	 by	 high	 operating	 costs	 associated	 with	 subsea	 intervention,	
development	 of	 new	 subsea	 fields	 in	 remote	 locations,	 and	 introduction	 of	 new	
complex	systems	to	the	seafloor	(such	as	subsea	compression,	multiphase	boosting	
and	 all‐electric	 control	 systems);	 the	 subsea	 industry	 has	 been	 forced	 to	 develop	
modern	sensors	to	keep	up	with	these	requirements.	
The	 current	 scheme	 for	 SPS	 providers’	 integration	with	 field	 operators	 system	 is	
limited.	Subsea	OEMs	only	have	access	to	the	SPS	system	via	the	MCS	only	when	the	
field	 operators	 have	 operational	 issues	 and	 require	 input	 from	 the	 SPS	 supplier.	
Moreover,	 the	 OEMs	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 the	 client’s	 production	 and	 asset	
management	systems.	As	a	result,	 the	advisory	generation	system	depicted	here	 is	
only	based	on	the	condition	of	the	equipment.	A	truly	integrated	operations	system,	
should	 integrate	 equipment	 data	 with	 the	 field	 data	 related	 to	 life	 cycle	 asset	
management.	An	 ideal	advisory	system	should	be	able	 to	generate	an	 intervention	
recommendation	based	on:	
 Condition	of	the	equipment	and	its	RUL.	
 Availability	of	spare	parts.	
 Availability	of	maintenance	personnel.	
 Availability	of	intervention	vessel/rig.	
 Economical	risks	associated	with	 loss	of	opportunity	based	on	maintenance	
performed	at	the	optimum	time	according	to	the	prognosis.	
 HSE,	economical	and	operational	risks	associated	with	deferred	maintenance	
due	 to	 production	 requirements,	 lack	 of	 intervention	 vessel/rig	 or	 need	 to	
wait	for	next	scheduled	maintenance	campaign.	
 Weather	forecast,	especially	in	arctic	regions	or	areas	with	harsh	weather.	
Despite	 the	 efforts	 claimed	 by	major	O&G	operators	 in	 IO,	 the	 fully	 integration	 of	
OEMs	with	the	operators’	system	is	still	quite	limited,	driven	by	the	sensitivity	of	the	
data.	 Oil	 companies	 have	 to	 open	 up	 to	 suppliers	 and	 provide	 access	 to	 their	
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operational	 and	 asset	 management	 systems,	 so	 the	 latter	 can	 provide	 better	
solutions	for	the	operators,	such	as	comprehensive	maintenance	recommendations.	
In	 return,	 OEMs	 will	 also	 be	 more	 open	 with	 operators	 and	 share	 important	
information	 related	 to	 design	 and	 fabrication	 of	 subsea	 equipment	 that	will	 allow	
both	parties	to	achieve	better	RAMS	levels.	
Lastly,	periodic	revision	of	the	CM	system	is	of	utmost	importance	for	guaranteeing	
precise	accuracy	of	the	health	assessment	of	the	assets.	Alarms	and	alert	set	points	
should	be	 refined	 as	well	 as	 baselines,	 if	 there	 are	 any	 changes	 in	 the	 equipment,	
such	 as	 modification	 of	 parts	 or	 operational	 parameters.	 Likewise	 Cameron	
engineers	have	to	stay	up	to	date	with	the	latest	monitoring	technologies,	so	modern	
and	more	accurate	sensors	can	be	used	in	future	applications	and	outdated	methods	
replaced.	 	
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Appendix A – Subsea Production System Architecture 
	
System  Subsystem / Component 
Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
SPS  Control 
system 
SCM (note 1) Baseplate   
         Electric/hydraulic couplers    
         Compensators   
         SEM Power supply
         Transformer
         Programmable 
integrated 
controller 
         Pressure 
transducer 
         Diplexer
         Modem
         Internal VEM
         DHPT 
         IsoBoards
         Connector 
board 
         Function blocks Solenoid driver 
module 
         Filter blocks   
         Digital transducer module    
         Selector valves   
         Pressure transmitters   
         Dump valve   
         Couplings   
         Lockdown mandrel   
      HPU (note 2)   
      EPU (note 2)   
      MCS (note 2)   
      SDU    
      Dynamic umbilical Bend restrictor   
         Buoyancy device   
         Hydraulic/chemical line    
         J/I‐tube seal   
         Power/signal line   
         Sheath/armour   
         Stabilizing & guidance 
equipment (note 2) 
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System  Subsystem / Component 
Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
 SPS 
(cont.) 
 Control 
system 
(cont.) 
 Dynamic umbilical (cont.) Subsea umbilical termination 
unit 
  
         Topside umbilical termination 
unit (note 2) 
  
         Tension and heave 
compensation 
system (note 2) 
  
      Static umbilical Hydraulic/chemical line    
         Power/signal line   
         Subsea umbilical termination 
unit 
  
         Topside umbilical termination 
unit (note 2) 
  
      Sensors  Pressure sensor   
         Temperature sensor   
         Flow sensor   
         Fluid level sensor   
         Leak detector   
         Sand detection sensor   
         Valve position sensor   
         Corrosion sensor   
         PIG detection sensor   
         Others   
  XT  On/off Valves and 
actuators 
Valve   
        Actuator   
      Choke module Hydraulic/chemical flying lead 
connection 
  
         Electrical/communication 
flying 
lead connection 
  
         Connector   
         Flow loop   
         Frame   
         Hose (flexible piping)   
         Piping (hard pipe)   
         Valve, check   
         Valve, choke   
         Valve, control   
         Valve, other   
      Sensors  See control system
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System  Subsystem / Component 
Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
 SPS 
(cont.) 
 XT (cont.) Tubing hanger Chemical injection coupling    
         Hydraulic coupling   
         Power/signal line   
         Tubing hanger body   
         Tubing hanger isolation plug    
      Jumper connection   
      Tree cap (internal or 
external) 
  
      Debris cap   
      Insulation   
      Piping/couplings Chemical injection coupling    
         Hose (flexible piping)   
         Hydraulic coupling   
         Piping (hard pipe)   
      Tree‐wellhead connector   
      ROV Panel   
      Cathodic protection   
   Wellhead 
system 
Casing strings /hangers   
      Annulus seal assemblies
(packoffs) 
  
      Conductor housing   
      Permanent guidebase 
(PGB) 
  
      Temporary guidebase 
(TGB) 
  
      Wellhead housing   
   Manifold On/off Valves and 
actuators 
Valve   
         Actuator   
      Sensors  See control system   
      HIPPS module      
      SCM    
      SDU    
      Connectors   
      Insulation   
      Piping/couplings   
      ROV Panel   
      Structure   
      Cathodic protection   
      Foundation   
      Mud mat
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System  Subsystem / Component 
Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
SPS 
(cont.) 
Template On/off Valves and 
actuators 
Valve   
        Actuator   
      Sensors  See control system   
      HIPPS module      
      SCM    
      SDU    
      Connectors   
      Insulation   
      Piping/couplings   
      ROV Panel   
      Structure   
      Cathodic protection   
      Foundation   
      Mud mat   
   EFL  Cable    
    Hose   
    Connector  
   HFL  Hose    
    Connector  
   Individual 
well HIPPS 
     
   Flowlines 
and 
Heating system   
   tie‐in spools  Cathodic protection   
      Connector   
      Insulation   
      Valve, process isolation   
      Structure
(protective or support) 
  
      Safety joint   
   Risers  Accessories Bend restrictor   
         Buoyancy device   
         J/I‐tube seal   
         Stabilizing & guidance 
equipment 
  
         Tension and heave 
compensation 
system 
  
      Heating system   
      Cathodic protection   
      Riser base Gas lift system   
         Structure   
         Valves   
      Connectors   
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System  Subsystem / Component 
Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
SPS 
(cont.) 
Subsea 
processing 
Subsea compressor   
  systems Subsea separator   
      Subsea booster pump   
              
 
Notes: 
 
1‐ The SCM system described here is for Electro‐Hydraulic Multiplexed control system, which is by far the 
most common type used by the time this report was written. 
2‐ Located topside 
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Appendix B – FMSA of hydraulic valve and actuator 
 
System Functions: Isolating and directing the flow of hydrocarbons or injection fluids 
	
Item  Failure Mode Failure Causes  Failure symptoms Method of detection Measurement 
location 
Frequency of 
monitoring 
Det Sev Dgn Pgn  MPN 
1.1  Internal leakage at 
gate & seat 
Erosion, corrosion or 
mechanical damage to the 
valve sealing surfaces 
(seal or gate) 
Dormant failure until the 
valve is shut. 
If leak is large enough 
indication of tubing head 
shut in pressure 
downstream when valve is 
shut 
Pressure test (see note 1) Upstream and 
downstream the valve
See note 2 3 3 4 4  144 
        
1.2  External leakage of 
production into the 
sea 
Failure of bonnet/stem 
seals assembly 
Changes in pressure of the 
tree production flowline 
Pressure transmitter in 
the flowline 
Tree production 
flowline, as close as 
possible to the valve 
Continuous 2 4 2 N/A  16 
Presence of leaked product 
in the surroundings 
Acoustic leak detector On top of the 
tree/template 
Continuous 3 4 4 N/A  48 
Fluorescence leak 
detection system 
On top of the 
tree/template 
Continuous 4 4 4 N/A  64 
Visual detection by ROV Around the tree Periodic 3 4 5 N/A  60 
Failure of body/bonnet 
connection gasket 
Changes in pressure of the 
tree production flowline 
Pressure transmitter in 
the flowline 
Tree production 
flowline, as close as 
possible to the valve 
Continuous 2 4 2 N/A  16 
Presence of leaked product 
in the surroundings of the 
tree 
Acoustic leak detector On top of the 
tree/template 
Continuous 3 4 4 N/A  48 
Fluorescence leak 
detection system 
On top of the 
tree/template 
Continuous 4 4 4 N/A  64 
Visual detection by ROV Around the tree Periodic 3 4 5 N/A  60 
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Item  Failure Mode Failure Causes  Failure symptoms Method of detection Measurement 
location 
Frequency of 
monitoring 
Det Sev Dgn Pgn  MPN 
1.3  Valve fails to open 
on demand from 
the closed position 
Actuator failure  Indication of zero 
production flow from tree 
instrumentation 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      No flow of control fluid if 
valve or actuator is jammed
Control fluid flowmeter Control fluid LP line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      Leakage of hydraulic fluid 
from pipe / actuator / 
SCMMB. 
Indication of zero 
production flow from tree 
instrumentation 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      No flow of control fluid if 
valve or actuator is jammed
Control fluid flowmeter Control fluid LP line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      Continuous control fluid 
flow 
Control fluid flowmeter Control fluid LP line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      Drop in topside control fluid 
reservoir level 
Level transmitter in 
reservoir (low level alarm)
Control fluid reservoir 
topside 
Continuous 4 3 3 N/A  36 
      Blocked / Plugged control 
lines 
Indication of zero 
production flow from tree 
instrumentation 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
      No flow of control fluid Control fluid flowmeter Control fluid LP line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
           
1.4  Spurious closure Leakage of hydraulic fluid 
from pipe / actuator / 
SCMMB 
Indication of zero 
production flow from tree 
instrumentation 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
Continuous control fluid 
flow 
Control fluid flowmeter Control fluid LP line Continuous 4 3 4 N/A  48 
Drop in topside control fluid 
reservoir level 
Level transmitter in 
reservoir (low level alarm)
Control fluid reservoir 
topside 
Continuous 4 3 3 N/A  36 
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Item  Failure Mode Failure Causes  Failure symptoms Method of detection Measurement 
location 
Frequency of 
monitoring 
Det Sev Dgn Pgn  MPN 
1.5  Valve fails to close 
on demand 
Blocked / Plugged control 
lines or valve 
Dormant failure until the 
valve is shut. 
If leak is large enough 
indication of tubing head 
shut in pressure 
downstream when valve is 
shut 
Partial stroke testing with 
valve signature analysis 
At valve See note 2 4 4 3 4  192 
         
1.6  Slow operation to 
the closed position 
Mechanical degradation 
in actuator or valve 
Very slow pressure decay 
after valve is closed 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 3 2 3 3  54 
Slow valve closing reading 
in valve signature 
Valve signature analysis Valve positioners in 
the valve block 
(optional). 
Control fluid 
flowmeter in LP line. 
Pressure transmitter 
in LP line 
During valve 
operation 
4 2 4 4  128 
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Item  Failure Mode Failure Causes  Failure symptoms Method of detection Measurement 
location 
Frequency of 
monitoring 
Det Sev Dgn Pgn  MPN 
1.7  Slow operation to 
the open position 
Mechanical degradation 
in actuator or valve 
Very slow pressure increase 
after valve is closed 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 3 1 3 3  27 
Slow valve opening reading 
in valve signature 
Valve signature analysis Control fluid 
flowmeter in LP line. 
Pressure transmitter 
in LP line. 
Valve positioners in 
the valve block 
(optional) 
During valve 
operation 
4 1 4 4  64 
Partial blockage of the 
supply control line 
Very slow pressure increase 
after valve is closed 
Process flow meter  Process line Continuous 3 1 3 3  27 
Slow valve opening reading 
in valve signature 
Valve signature analysis Control fluid 
flowmeter in LP line. 
Pressure transmitter 
in LP line. 
Valve positioners in 
the valve block 
(optional) 
During valve 
operation 
4 1 4 4  64 
       
Notes: 
 
1. Only applicable for Production Master Valve (PMV) and Production Wing Valve (PWV) 
2. Per NORSOK D‐010: The principal valves acting as barriers in the production tree shall be tested at regular intervals as follows: 
• test duration shall be 10 min, 
• monthly, until three consecutive qualified tests have been 
performed, thereafter ‐ 
• every three months, until three consecutive qualified tests have been performed, 
thereafter – 
• every six months. 
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Appendix C – Valve profile data 
	
# scan offset time [sec]     0.000  # recorded measure points    1000 
# measure time      [sec]     6.000  # valve command              open 
# sample interval [sec]     0.012 
#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
1  0.012  390  50  35  0.42  6180  4200 
2  0.024  1570  200  36  0.432  5940  4250 
3  0.036  2040  500  37  0.444  6250  4300 
4  0.048  1980  600  38  0.456  6270  4350 
5  0.06  3250  800  39  0.468  5960  4400 
6  0.072  3930  900  40  0.48  6160  4450 
7  0.084  4650  1110  41  0.492  6210  4500 
8  0.096  5440  1200  42  0.504  6060  4550 
9  0.108  6080  1375  43  0.516  5980  4600 
10  0.12  6080  1450  44  0.528  5960  4650 
11  0.132  6310  1600  45  0.54  6090  4700 
12  0.144  6330  1800  46  0.552  6040  4750 
13  0.156  6090  2100  47  0.564  6020  4800 
14  0.168  6520  2300  48  0.576  6430  4850 
15  0.18  6330  2600  49  0.588  6230  4900 
16  0.192  6660  2700  50  0.6  6330  4950 
17  0.204  6450  2800  51  0.612  6040  5000 
18  0.216  6310  2900  52  0.624  6180  5050 
19  0.228  6250  3000  53  0.636  6430  5100 
20  0.24  5770  3100  54  0.648  5980  5140 
21  0.252  6060  3175  55  0.66  6370  5210 
22  0.264  5940  3250  56  0.672  6230  5280 
23  0.276  6140  3325  57  0.684  6210  5350 
24  0.288  6080  3400  58  0.696  6370  5420 
25  0.3  5960  3475  59  0.708  6210  5490 
26  0.312  5920  3550  60  0.72  6060  5560 
27  0.324  5940  3625  61  0.732  6250  5630 
28  0.336  6270  3700  62  0.744  5800  5700 
29  0.348  6080  3775  63  0.756  6000  5770 
30  0.36  6090  3850  64  0.768  6470  5840 
31  0.372  6090  3925  65  0.78  6310  5910 
32  0.384  6200  4000  66  0.792  6060  5980 
33  0.396  6180  4075  67  0.804  6120  6050 
34  0.408  6490  4150  68  0.816  6270  6120 
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#  OpeningT
ime (s) 
Healthy(real 
data) 
Defective(a
ssumed 
data) 
#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
69  0.828  6310  6190  110  1.32  7380  6880 
70  0.84  6600  6260  111  1.332  7510  7010 
71  0.852  6210  6330  112  1.344  7240  6740 
72  0.864  6470  6400  113  1.356  7530  7030 
73  0.876  6430  6470  114  1.368  7490  6990 
74  0.888  6560  6540  115  1.38  7510  7010 
75  0.9  6540  6610  116  1.392  7410  6910 
76  0.912  6520  6680  117  1.404  7490  6990 
77  0.924  6370  6750  118  1.416  7470  6970 
78  0.936  6370  6820  119  1.428  7550  7050 
79  0.948  6520  6020  120  1.44  7670  7170 
80  0.96  6290  5790  121  1.452  7430  6930 
81  0.972  6470  5970  122  1.464  7490  6990 
82  0.984  6520  6020  123  1.476  7630  7130 
83  0.996  6500  6000  124  1.488  7610  7110 
84  1.008  6410  5910  125  1.5  7680  7180 
85  1.02  6890  6390  126  1.512  7680  7180 
86  1.032  6680  6180  127  1.524  7530  7030 
87  1.044  6620  6120  128  1.536  7610  7110 
88  1.056  6790  6290  129  1.548  7490  6990 
89  1.068  6450  5950  130  1.56  7740  7240 
90  1.08  6690  6190  131  1.572  7550  7050 
91  1.092  6740  6240  132  1.584  7630  7130 
92  1.104  6870  6370  133  1.596  7650  7150 
93  1.116  6970  6470  134  1.608  7700  7200 
94  1.128  7070  6570  135  1.62  7900  7400 
95  1.14  6970  6470  136  1.632  7650  7150 
96  1.152  6790  6290  137  1.644  7680  7180 
97  1.164  6760  6260  138  1.656  7670  7170 
98  1.176  7160  6660  139  1.668  7840  7340 
99  1.188  6970  6470  140  1.68  7680  7180 
100  1.2  7030  6530  141  1.692  7960  7300 
101  1.212  7260  6760  142  1.704  7940  7200 
102  1.224  6810  6310  143  1.716  7740  7240 
103  1.236  7240  6740  144  1.728  7820  7320 
104  1.248  7030  6530  145  1.74  7840  7340 
105  1.26  7260  6760  146  1.752  7920  7200 
106  1.272  7360  6860  147  1.764  7800  7150 
107  1.284  7220  6720  148  1.776  7650  7150 
108  1.296  7390  6890  149  1.788  7760  7260 
109  1.308  7410  6910  150  1.8  7860  7360 
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#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
  #  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
151  1.812  7840  7300  192  2.304  18870  7800 
152  1.824  7900  7250  193  2.316  18960  7900 
153  1.836  7780  7280  194  2.328  19030  7950 
154  1.848  8110  7300  195  2.34  19030  8000 
155  1.86  7800  7350  196  2.352  18960  7950 
156  1.872  7700  7300  197  2.364  18940  8000 
157  1.884  7940  7350  198  2.376  18870  7740 
158  1.896  7990  7400  199  2.388  18710  7790 
159  1.908  7860  7360  200  2.4  18560  7660 
160  1.92  7940  7440  201  2.412  18340  7740 
161  1.932  8070  7370  202  2.424  18200  7870 
162  1.944  7590  7200  203  2.436  18180  7390 
163  1.956  7860  7360  204  2.448  18100  7660 
164  1.968  7970  7470  205  2.46  18260  7770 
165  1.98  7960  7460  206  2.472  18390  7760 
166  1.992  7940  7440  207  2.484  18560  7740 
167  2.004  7970  7470  208  2.496  18790  7770 
168  2.016  9240  7500  209  2.508  18960  9040 
169  2.028  10510  7650  210  2.52  19160  10310 
170  2.04  11780  7550  211  2.532  19330  11580 
171  2.052  13050  7700  212  2.544  19400  12850 
172  2.064  14320  7600  213  2.556  19480  14120 
173  2.076  15590  7500  214  2.568  19480  15390 
174  2.088  16860  7650  215  2.58  19500  16660 
175  2.1  18130  7500  216  2.592  19430  17930 
176  2.112  18340  7700  217  2.604  19350  18140 
177  2.124  18410  7800  218  2.616  19250  18210 
178  2.136  18410  7700  219  2.628  19100  18210 
179  2.148  18270  7650  220  2.64  18960  18070 
180  2.16  17950  7900  221  2.652  18870  17750 
181  2.172  17570  7800  222  2.664  18830  17370 
182  2.184  17180  7900  223  2.676  18810  17000 
183  2.196  16950  7955  224  2.688  18790  17050 
184  2.208  16870  7700  225  2.7  18830  17080 
185  2.22  16820  7650  226  2.712  18870  17100 
186  2.232  16950  7900  227  2.724  19030  17200 
187  2.244  17180  7800  228  2.736  19180  17300 
188  2.256  17490  7900  229  2.748  19330  17500 
189  2.268  17870  7700  230  2.76  19480  17700 
190  2.28  18260  7650  231  2.772  19580  18060 
191  2.292  18620  7900  232  2.784  19630  18420 
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#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
#  Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
233  2.796  19630  18670  274  3.288  19480  19430 
234  2.808  19650  18760  275  3.3  19480  19450 
235  2.82  19630  18830  276  3.312  19480  19430 
236  2.832  19630  18830  277  3.324  19430  19430 
237  2.844  19560  18760  278  3.336  19400  19360 
238  2.856  19480  18740  279  3.348  19330  19280 
239  2.868  19360  18670  280  3.36  19330  19160 
240  2.88  19290  18510  281  3.372  19290  19090 
241  2.892  19180  18360  282  3.384  19250  18980 
242  2.904  19160  18140  283  3.396  19250  18960 
243  2.916  19200  18000  284  3.408  19290  19000 
244  2.928  19140  17980  285  3.42  19250  18940 
245  2.94  19100  17900  286  3.432  19270  18900 
246  2.952  19180  18060  287  3.444  19330  18980 
247  2.964  19250  18190  288  3.456  19350  19050 
248  2.976  19330  18360  289  3.468  19380  19130 
249  2.988  19400  18590  290  3.48  19400  19200 
250  3  19460  18760  291  3.492  19400  19260 
251  3.012  19520  18960  292  3.504  19400  19320 
252  3.024  19480  19130  293  3.516  19400  19280 
253  3.036  19560  19200  294  3.528  19400  19360 
254  3.048  19500  19280  295  3.54  19400  19300 
255  3.06  19560  19280  296  3.552  19400  19300 
256  3.072  19480  19300  297  3.564  19400  19300 
257  3.084  19480  19230  298  3.576  19400  19300 
258  3.096  19400  19150  299  3.588  19350  19250 
259  3.108  19330  19050  300  3.6  19350  19250 
260  3.12  19290  18900  301  3.612  19330  19230 
261  3.132  19250  18760  302  3.624  19330  19230 
262  3.144  19230  18670  303  3.636  19330  19230 
263  3.156  19180  18630  304  3.648  19330  19230 
264  3.168  19180  18610  305  3.66  19330  19230 
265  3.18  19210  18590  306  3.672  19330  19230 
266  3.192  19250  18630  307  3.684  19330  19230 
267  3.204  19330  18670  308  3.696  19400  19300 
268  3.216  19360  18830  309  3.708  19400  19300 
269  3.228  19400  18980  310  3.72  19400  19300 
270  3.24  19480  19130  311  3.732  19400  19300 
271  3.252  19480  19280  312  3.744  19400  19300 
272  3.264  19480  19380  313  3.756  19400  19300 
273  3.276  19480  19430  314  3.768  19400  19300 
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# 
Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
   
# 
Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
315  3.78  19400  19300  356  4.272  19360  19260 
316  3.792  19400  19300  357  4.284  19360  19260 
317  3.804  19400  19300  358  4.296  19350  19250 
318  3.816  19400  19300  359  4.308  19380  19280 
319  3.828  19400  19300  360  4.32  19360  19260 
320  3.84  19400  19300  361  4.332  19400  19300 
321  3.852  19400  19300  362  4.344  19350  19250 
322  3.864  19400  19300  363  4.356  19360  19260 
323  3.876  19400  19300  364  4.368  19380  19280 
324  3.888  19400  19300  365  4.38  19360  19260 
325  3.9  19400  19300  366  4.392  19360  19260 
326  3.912  19400  19300  367  4.404  19380  19280 
327  3.924  19400  19300  368  4.416  19400  19300 
328  3.936  19400  19300  369  4.428  19360  19260 
329  3.948  19400  19300  370  4.44  19380  19280 
330  3.96  19400  19300  371  4.452  19380  19280 
331  3.972  19400  19300  372  4.464  19360  19260 
332  3.984  19400  19300  373  4.476  19400  19300 
333  3.996  19400  19300  374  4.488  19360  19260 
334  4.008  19400  19300  375  4.5  19360  19260 
335  4.02  19400  19300  376  4.512  19350  19250 
336  4.032  19400  19300  377  4.524  19380  19280 
337  4.044  19400  19300  378  4.536  19360  19260 
338  4.056  19400  19300  379  4.548  19380  19280 
339  4.068  19400  19300  380  4.56  19360  19260 
340  4.08  19400  19300  381  4.572  19400  19300 
341  4.092  19400  19300  382  4.584  19380  19280 
342  4.104  19400  19300  383  4.596  19400  19300 
343  4.116  19380  19280  384  4.608  19380  19280 
344  4.128  19400  19300  385  4.62  19400  19300 
345  4.14  19400  19300  386  4.632  19400  19300 
346  4.152  19380  19280  387  4.644  19400  19300 
347  4.164  19380  19280  388  4.656  19400  19300 
348  4.176  19400  19300  389  4.668  19400  19300 
349  4.188  19400  19300  390  4.68  19400  19300 
350  4.2  19400  19300  391  4.692  19400  19300 
351  4.212  19360  19260  392  4.704  19380  19280 
352  4.224  19380  19280  393  4.716  19400  19300 
353  4.236  19400  19300  394  4.728  19400  19300 
354  4.248  19400  19300  395  4.74  19400  19300 
355  4.26  19380  19280  396  4.752  19400  19300 
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# 
Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
   
# 
Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data) 
Defective 
(assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
397  4.764  19400  19300  438  5.256  19400  19300 
398  4.776  19400  19300  439  5.268  19400  19300 
399  4.788  19400  19300  440  5.28  19400  19300 
400  4.8  19400  19300  441  5.292  19400  19300 
401  4.812  19400  19300  442  5.304  19400  19300 
402  4.824  19400  19300  443  5.316  19400  19300 
403  4.836  19400  19300  444  5.328  19400  19300 
404  4.848  19400  19300  445  5.34  19400  19300 
405  4.86  19400  19300  446  5.352  19400  19300 
406  4.872  19400  19300  447  5.364  19400  19300 
407  4.884  19400  19300  448  5.376  19400  19300 
408  4.896  19400  19300  449  5.388  19400  19300 
409  4.908  19400  19300  450  5.4  19400  19300 
410  4.92  19400  19300  451  5.412  19400  19300 
411  4.932  19400  19300  452  5.424  19400  19300 
412  4.944  19400  19300  453  5.436  19400  19300 
413  4.956  19400  19300  454  5.448  19430  19330 
414  4.968  19400  19300  455  5.46  19400  19300 
415  4.98  19400  19300  456  5.472  19400  19300 
416  4.992  19400  19300  457  5.484  19400  19300 
417  5.004  19400  19300  458  5.496  19400  19300 
418  5.016  19400  19300  459  5.508  19430  19330 
419  5.028  19400  19300  460  5.52  19400  19300 
420  5.04  19400  19300  461  5.532  19400  19300 
421  5.052  19400  19300  462  5.544  19400  19300 
422  5.064  19400  19300  463  5.556  19430  19330 
423  5.076  19400  19300  464  5.568  19400  19300 
424  5.088  19400  19300  465  5.58  19450  19350 
425  5.1  19400  19300  466  5.592  19430  19330 
426  5.112  19400  19300  467  5.604  19430  19330 
427  5.124  19400  19300  468  5.616  19450  19350 
428  5.136  19400  19300  469  5.628  19430  19330 
429  5.148  19400  19300  470  5.64  19450  19350 
430  5.16  19400  19300  471  5.652  19450  19350 
431  5.172  19400  19300  472  5.664  19460  19360 
432  5.184  19400  19300  473  5.676  19480  19380 
433  5.196  19400  19300  474  5.688  19460  19360 
434  5.208  19450  19350  475  5.7  19450  19350 
435  5.22  19400  19300  476  5.712  19460  19360 
436  5.232  19400  19300  477  5.724  19480  19380 
437  5.244  19400  19300  478  5.736  19450  19350 
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# 
Opening 
Time (s) 
Healthy 
(real data)  Defective (assumed 
data) 
Press. (psi)  Press. (psi) 
479  5.748  19460  19360 
480  5.76  19460  19360 
481  5.772  19460  19360 
482  5.784  19460  19360 
483  5.796  19460  19360 
484  5.808  19480  19380 
485  5.82  19480  19380 
486  5.832  19480  19380 
487  5.844  19480  19380 
488  5.856  19480  19380 
489  5.868  19480  19380 
490  5.88  19480  19380 
491  5.892  19480  19380 
492  5.904  19480  19380 
493  5.916  19480  19380 
494  5.928  19480  19380 
495  5.94  19480  19380 
496  5.952  19480  19380 
497  5.964  19480  19380 
498  5.976  19480  19380 
499  5.988  19480  19380 
500  6  19480  19380 
	
	
	 79	
Appendix D – Dashboard 
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Appendix E – FMSA of power supply unit 
	
System Functions: convert the high input voltage to a low output voltage	
	
Item  Failure Mode Failure Causes  Failure symptoms Method of detection  Measurement 
location 
Frequency of 
monitoring 
Det Sev Dgn Pgn  MPN 
1.1  Loss of output 
from PSU all 
supply voltages 
PSU Failure  Loss of power in the SEM 
affected. 
Combination model 
temperature, I/O voltage 
and I/O current 
measurement 
Input and 
output modules 
Continuous 4 1 4 3  48 
             
1.2  Loss of output 
from one of the 
PSU supply 
voltages 
Converter failure ‐
Electrolytic capacitor 
deterioration 
Increase in capacitor's 
Equivalent Series 
Resistance (ESR) and 
decrease in capacitance 
Small ripple voltage and 
ripple current increase 
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 4 4  64 
Raising temperatures in 
the capacitor core  
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 3 3  36 
             
1.3  High output 
voltage 
Converter failure ‐
Electrolytic capacitor 
deterioration 
Increase in capacitor's 
Equivalent Series 
Resistance (ESR) and 
decrease in capacitance 
Small ripple voltage and 
ripple current increase 
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 4 4  64 
Raising temperatures in 
the capacitor core  
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 3 3  36 
             
1.4  Low output 
voltage 
Converter failure ‐
Electrolytic capacitor 
deterioration 
Increase in capacitor's 
Equivalent Series 
Resistance (ESR) and 
decrease in capacitance 
Small ripple voltage and 
ripple current increase 
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 4 4  64 
Raising temperatures in 
the capacitor core  
Electrolytic 
capacitor  
Continuous 4 1 3 3  36 
	
